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―Em ciência, não é necessário que um 
homem trilhe seu caminho  
pisando apenas em verdades, quando, às 
vezes, é suficiente que ele inspire outros a 
pensarem de forma diferente.‖ 
Newton da Costa 
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RESUMO 
 
A presente tese consiste em um ensaio de ontologia, o qual chamo de 
Interacionista. A Ontologia Interacionista afirma que a realidade 
consiste nessas restrições que limitam o campo de interações possíveis 
para aquele das interações com sucesso com o entorno. Contudo, como 
qualquer sentido de realidade que venhamos a ter advém de nossa 
experiência interna, meu primeiro esforço será o de relacionar nossa 
noção intuitiva e interna de realidade com essa de interação. Desse 
modo, no segundo capítulo, interpreto o Sistema Nervoso Central (SNC) 
como um sistema de controle que produz motricidade a fim preservar a 
vida do organismo. Nossas representações internas são entendidas como 
uma estratégia para melhorar o desempenho de controle. A eficiência do 
controle depende da capacidade de processamento de informação, que 
por sua vez reflete na qualidade de nossas representações. Nesse 
contexto, qualquer conteúdo representacional, quer sejam nossas 
representações biológicas ou qualquer representação formal, é 
interpretado como cumprindo um papel de produção de ação. No 
terceiro capítulo, questiono sobre se o processamento de informação do 
SNC teria alguma perda de informação – isto é, se nós seríamos capazes 
de ―ver‖ toda a realidade. Defino uma medida do desempenho do SNC 
em termos de ações com sucesso: nenhuma perda implica nenhum 
acidente e alguma perda implica em algum acidente. No quarto capítulo, 
assumo que nossa percepção é um caso de processamento com perda de 
informação e investigo sobre como o SNC escolhe os bits adequados 
para a sobrevivência do organismo. Minha explicação reserva um lugar 
tanto para a contribuição evolucionária quanto para a cultural. A 
contribuição evolucionária a nossa percepção ocorre ao nível do sistema 
de processamento periférico a qual define um amplo conjunto de 
categorias – os aspectos mais gerais de nossa percepção. A contribuição 
cultural ocorre ao longo do desenvolvimento do organismo e define um 
conjunto mais específico de características da percepção. Defendo que 
fatores culturais, desde interações entre grupos sociais até o manuseio de 
linguagens formais, formam um espectro contínuo moldando nossa 
percepção. No quinto capítulo, questiono sobre como o SNC poderia 
aumentar seu processamento de informação. Interpreto o advento do 
surgimento das linguagens simbólicas como uma estratégia que reduz o 
custo de processamento de informação, desse modo, aumentando nosso 
controle sobre o entorno. No último capítulo, desenvolvo a tese 
ontológica interacionista em detalhes e comento outras consequências 
filosóficas.  
10 
 
Palavras-chaves: ontologia; modelo interno; sistema de processamento 
de informação; limites de processamento cerebral; teoria da codificação. 
 
11 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis is an endeavor to construct an ontology which I call 
Interactionist. The Ontological Interactionist thesis claims that reality 
consists of those constraints which limit the range of all possible 
interactions to those that are successful with environment. As any sense 
of reality comes from one‘s internal experience, my first endeavor is to 
relate one‘s internal and intuitive notion of reality with that of 
interaction. Therefore, in the second chapter, I interpret the Central 
Nervous System (CNS) as a control system which produces motricity in 
order to keep the organism alive while one‘s internal representations are 
understood as a strategy to improve the control performance. The 
control efficiency depends on the information processing systems 
capacity, which reflects the quality of our representations. In this setup, 
any representational content, whether the biological internal 
representations or any formal representation, is interpreted as playing a 
role in the production of action. In the third chapter, I will question 
whether or not the CNS‘s processing has any loss of information – i.e. 
whether or not one is able to ―see‖ everything in the outside world. I 
will define a measure of the CNS‘s performance in terms of successful 
actions; no losses imply no accidents and any loss implies some 
accident. As accidents are widespread in one‘s life, I conclude that we 
are treating a lossy case. In the forth chapter I will assume that one‘s 
perception is a lossy processing case and I will question how the CNS 
chooses the right bits in order to survive. My explanation reserves a 
place for the evolutionary as well as cultural contribution. The 
evolutionary contribution occurs at the peripheral processing system 
which defines a broad set of categories – the broad aspects of one‘s 
perception. The cultural contribution occurs along the organism‘s 
development and defines a more specific set of perception‘s features – 
like specific patterns. I will defend that cultural factors, from motor 
group interactions to the mastering of mathematical language, form a 
continuous spectrum shaping one‘s perception. In the fifth chapter I will 
question how the CNS can improve its information processing. I will 
interpret the devising of the symbolic language as a strategy that reduces 
the processing costs, thereby, increasing one‘s control over the 
environment. In the last chapter I will unfold the Ontological 
Interactionist thesis previously stated and will comment on some 
philosophical implications. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation intends to be a philosophical essay about 
ontology.  I am looking for a very general ―statement‖ or ―idea,‖ to say, 
on the being qua being, as opposed to the being qua knowing. The 
search for this very peculiar idea is represented by the question, ―what 
(exists) is there?‖ The clause of generality means that I‘m not interested 
in an idea that just describes a subcategory of entities – such as 
biological organisms, or inanimate objects, or numbers.  Rather, I am 
interested in an answer that covers the whole domain of existence – in 
some sense of ―existence‖ which has to be determined. Sometimes one 
has to offer more than just a simple answer since one‘s domain of 
existence is comprised of two or more ontological categories – e.g. 
material objects and souls. The being qua being, as opposed to the being 
qua knowing, is one of the most important distinctions qualifying an 
ontological project. How one decides to relate these notions will give 
rise to different ontologies. Some think the being qua knowing is 
everything that exists. Therefore, when they die, everything dies with 
them
1
. Others think there is something beyond someone‘s knowing‘s 
such that it transcends their own existence. One may suppose that those 
belonging to the first group would tend to be more selfish, while those 
belonging to the second group would tend to be more altruistic.  
Anyway, ontological questions are very important because they are 
lurking behind a very large domain of belief in our lives, ranging from 
our most common conceptions of daily life to our most complex ideas in 
the field of science.  
In order to introduce the main idea of this philosophical 
dissertation, let me contrast it with a very broad picture of what I take to 
be the dominant philosophical approach to ontology. I think it wouldn‘t 
be a crime to say that the ideas of ―representation‖ or ―something 
representing something else‖ have been an obsession characterizing the 
dominant approach to ontology through the history of philosophy. From 
Plato‘s forms through Kant‘s representation, until the most abstract 
                                                             
1
 In fact, there are many different conceptions of ontological idealism 
throughout the history of philosophy, such as subjective, objective, absolute 
idealism and even more obscure characterizations such as speculative idealism 
and transcendental idealism. However, it seems safe to say that within modern 
philosophy, idealism is understood as the conception in which something 
mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate foundation of all reality 
(GUYER AND HORSTMANN, 2015).  
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logical structures in recent analytic philosophy, many philosophers seem 
to be looking for a representation that most generally ―matches‖ with the 
outside world in some sense. Exceptions seem to be Heidegger, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, and few others. Their philosophies differ according to 
what one elects as the ―correct‖ representation and the way it bridges the 
knowing subject and the world out there.   
In recent analytical philosophy, the dominant philosophical 
approach has been either those projects grounded on the notion of 
univocal reference or those grounded on the notion of universal 
conceptual scheme. The univocal reference projects are the pragmatic 
versions which say that those devices which better individuate the 
outside entities constitute the representation which better match with the 
world – much of the ontologies blossomed by the linguistic philosophy 
are of this kind. The universal conceptual scheme projects are the 
epistemological versions which say that the conceptual scheme logically 
presupposed in our best descriptions of the world is the representation 
that better matches with the world outside – logicist and structuralist 
ontologies are of this kind. There still remains the possibility of 
rejecting the existence of the unique representation and accepting the 
possibility of infinite representations of the world – ontological 
pluralism. What all of these positions seem to have in common is the 
meta-ontology represented by the basic metaphor in which a painter is 
painting a view and the philosopher wants to inspect whether or not he 
has used the right colors, traits, and so on. The philosopher knows the 
painter can depict the same view by using different techniques, but he is 
looking for those that match ultimately and undoubtedly with the real 
world. Therefore, the philosopher has looked despairingly for criteria 
and arguments which hold up the correspondence between the paint and 
the view the painter sees. But what if this metaphor is not good enough? 
  Recent achievements in the new brain sciences have provided 
evidence that we seem to have been betrayed by the very impingent 
representational insight just as we have been betrayed by the Euclidian 
insight about the nature of space. First, recent results in cognitive 
science and neuropsychology have strongly suggested that any sense of 
reality we are able to become aware of is a brain‘s construct. This 
construct has much illusion and, mainly, doesn‘t have all the 
information about the outside world. But more importantly, if any sense 
of reality is inside the brain, how can we talk about correspondence with 
something out there?  Second, the anthropocentric insight which says 
that our brain is a thinking machine is wrong. All the empirical evidence 
about the brain functions corroborate the interpretation that the brain is 
25 
 
in fact an action machine. Of course, it is not to deny that we think – 
which we experience all the time – but it is to stress the fact that it is just 
a middle step in the production of action. If one refers to the brain as a 
thinking machine, he is using a very incomplete description; because it 
precludes the primary brain purpose: Motricity. From the philosophical 
point of view, the moral of the story is that in order to find any 
ontological substratum one better inquire into the concept of action 
rather than of representation. However, since any notion of ―real‖ that 
one can make sense of comes from the representational and internal 
point of view, we cannot simply inquire into action directly. We have to 
first inspect the relation between the internal notion of reality 
constructed by our brain and the final product resulting from it: Motor 
Twitches. This is precisely the theme of my second chapter.  
Assuming that our subjective experience is grounded on Central 
Nervous System (CNS) dynamics, I start the dissertation‘s second 
chapter by questioning why we have such a system. While static 
animals, like plants, haven‘t required a chordate system in order to 
survive, moving animals seem to have the necessity of it to perseverate. 
Moving through the environment seems to be much more dangerous 
than just staying static in the same spot. According to this view, the 
CNS is a system that garners information from the environment in order 
to predict future events and avoid eventual accidents. The CNS‘s 
performance depends on its information processing capacity. However, 
even in this conceptual framework it is not clear why it needs an internal 
representation of the environment. Robots do exactly the same but don‘t 
seem to have any such thing as an internal experience! The role played 
by the internal representation is understood in the difference between 
robotic and biological systems: Noise. While robotic systems are 
virtually noise-free systems, biological systems are fully noise systems. 
For example, much of the signals emitted by our ganglion cells, in the 
retina, don‘t arrive at the visual system on the occipital lobe. But, 
maybe, the most harmful kind of noise present in the biological system 
is time delay. The experience characterizing our subjective life cannot 
be simply caused by the environmental stimuli; if it were, we would be 
unable to do things as simple as catching fruit.  Because our action plans 
cannot be chosen directly based on the environmental information 
affecting our sensory organs, the CNS seems to engulf the environment 
in order to avoid time delay noise. By doing so, the system chooses the 
better plan to survive now based on a time-noise-free signal: The 
internal model of the environment. However, how good is this 
―engulfing?‖ 
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The subjective experience understood as a middle step in the 
generation of actions assumes a very important place in the scene. As 
suggested by the Data Processing Inequality Theorem (DPI) in 
Information Theory, no encoding process can create new information; 
i.e. the complexity of our action plans cannot be greater than that 
exhibited by our internal representations. The worse the quality of the 
internal representation, the more dangerous our action plan is.  This idea 
gives an objective criterion with which to measure the quality of our 
representations in terms of the efficiency of our action plans. In order to 
assert this idea, in the third chapter I interpret the Central Nervous 
System as a communication channel for which sensory stimuli are input 
and motor twitches (actions) are output. The channel input sequences 
are viewed as the different environmental situations, the motor output as 
the action plans, and our representations as a channel code conveying 
information through the channel. As the CNS‘s raison d’être is to 
maintain the integrity of the organism as it navigates through the 
environment, any accident can be interpreted as a processing error.  In 
other words, the CNS wouldn‘t typically choose an action plan which 
ends up harming the organism unless it misperceives or doesn‘t perceive 
some environmental information. Accordingly, we just have to pay 
attention to the probability of one‘s accident (error) as one moves 
through the environment to find out whether or not he/she is ―seeing‖ 
everything from the outside world. If the probability of an accident 
occurring is above zero, then we are not experiencing everything out 
there. Though the model is, in principle, testable, it is not necessary to 
test it to conclude that we cannot ―see‖ everything out there. That‘s 
because accidents are abundant throughout our lives. Therefore, the 
―engulfing‖ is not as good as we used to think of it – or more precisely 
we‘re not processing every bit of information from the environment.  
I think some readers may frown upon using these information 
theoretical notions to interpret the CNS, arguing that they are too simple 
to explain the dynamics of such complex systems. At this point it is 
important to emphasize the generality and adequacy of these metaphors. 
For example, I heard some time ago the following objection: ―You‘ve 
interpreted the CNS as a channel but, in fact, it is much more than a 
device that simply responds to an input. The CNS behaves more like a 
closed system having its own autonomy. Therefore, your model 
oversimplifies the CNS‘s dynamics.‖ I think this kind of objection 
comes rather from the intuitive idea associated with the terms naming 
the mathematical notions than from the mathematical notions 
themselves. Concerning this specific case, the notion of a 
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communication channel in information theory just requires that two 
points have some statistic dependence and nothing more. And it is 
undeniable that there is a statistical correlation between the stimuli 
affecting our sensory organs and our motor responses. Similarly, 
interpreting our subjective experience as channel code doesn‘t obligate 
one to find the functions the brain deploys to process sensory input and 
generate motor output. The theory is sufficiently abstract to describe the 
contours of relation between organism and environment without getting 
into fine-grained questions.      
 According to that argument, because we don‘t interact safely 
with environment all the time, our subjective experience seems to be a 
lossy representation of the environment – i.e. a representation that 
leaves something out. It seems to occur either because the CNS does not 
have sufficient capacity to lossless process all the environmental 
information or because the CNS is not using an optimum channel code. 
Either way, the argument seems to be satisfactory to convince one that 
we‘re not ―seeing‖ everything out there. However, if we‘re not ―seeing‖ 
everything from outside, how does the CNS choose the bits it processes? 
One may think that the CNS chooses randomly. Though it doesn‘t 
appear to be the case, since there seems to be a coarse-grained 
convergence in our experience through different cultures and a fine-
grained convergence in the same cultural community. The coarse-
grained convergence refers to the perception‘s inborn traits that we seem 
to share – such as color, form, texture characteristics. While the fine-
grained convergence refers to the perspectival traits that the 
community‘s members share – such as the difference between melody 
and harmony as perceived by musicians, specific patterns in nature as 
perceived by scientists, or the cardinal points as perceived by the 
members of the Aboriginal community on the western edge of Cape 
York in northern Australia.  
In the fourth chapter I will offer a model to explain how the 
CNS chooses the bits it processes. In the same way our subjective 
experience seems to present two levels of convergence, the CNS‘s 
information processing will also be divided into the model in two stages. 
The first one, which I call the innate perceptual stage, explains the 
coarse-grained convergence level through the cytoarchiteture of our 
sensory organs. The cytoarchiteture of our sensory organs is interpreted 
as encoding functions that encode the environmental information 
according to an evolutionary criterion – i.e. the information that has 
been important to the organisms survive. Hypothetically, a full range of 
encoding functions has been deployed since the beginning of life; those 
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organisms whose cytoarchiteture had encoded mostly irrelevant 
information for life, has demised. The information encoded by the 
cytoarchiteture of the successful organisms defines a range of categories 
upon which the next perceptual level is constructed – the colors, size, 
velocities and smells we are able to perceive. A second processing stage 
is theoretically needed in order to explain the perspectival trait featuring 
our perception. If the higher order processing stages of brain deployed a 
lossless encoding, then we wouldn‘t have the opportunity to experience 
such a thing as a perspective of something – our perception would be 
rather like a photograph camera: every shot would contain all the 
possible perspectives in it, at a fixed time and localization. In the second 
processing stage, which I call learned perception, the brain extracts and 
encodes the most important information coming from the different 
sensory organs – eyes, ears, skin, and taste buds –  into a multimodal 
representation. The perspectival trait means that the brain cannot 
construct a perfect representation, either because it does not have 
capacity enough to process the whole transmitted information through 
the sensory pathway or because it is not deploying an optimal channel 
code. The question is: What criterion is the brain employing to choose 
the bits at this second stage? According to my model, the brain chooses 
those bits of specific sensory modality that are mostly statistically 
dependent on the bits of another specific sensory modality – e.g. we 
tend to see that portion of environment that is most correlated with the 
sounds it emits. In my model, different patterns of signal have different 
statistical dependence on each other generating different representations 
with different degrees of informativeness. The different patterns of 
signal can be interpreted as everything that makes sense to our mind - 
such as language, graphs, symbols, pictures, movies – influencing our 
experience of the world – i.e. producing a different representation.  
The interesting thing about choosing bits is that the CNS can 
improve its performance by processing only those bits that maximize the 
organism‘s survival chances, thereby, not wasting energy with irrelevant 
information. Therefore, musicians are good with sounds but not, in 
general, with colors; painters with colors but not, in general, with 
sounds; and scientists with patterns but not, in general, with details
2
. 
However, no matter how good the choice is, the amount of information 
reliably processed by the CNS cannot be greater than its cost-capacity. 
The explanation needs an amendment in order to match the abrupt 
                                                             
2
 I remember some scientists saying that music is mathematics and throwing 
most of its beauty away.  
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increasing of control that humanity has had since the rise of symbolic 
mathematics – mainly the invention of the differential calculus. If the 
choosing-bits hypothesis were responsible for this abrupt increasing of 
control, it would imply that we have succeeded as a species choosing 
mostly wrong bits – what doesn‘t make much sense. An alternative, in 
order to improve the information processing without changing the 
channel, is to use a different channel code. In real systems every 
transmission has a cost which limits the channel capacity – e.g. in 
biological organisms these costs range from energy to time delay. 
However, sometimes by using a different channel code one is able to 
transmit the same amount of information with lower costs than it was 
necessary to transmit by using the old channel code. Therefore, cheaper 
coding schemes may increase abruptly the transmission/processing. 
In the fifth chapter I will interpret the symbolic language‘s role 
in increasing our control over the environment as a cheaper channel 
code. I will argue that our biological representation – the world as we 
used to conceive it – is a channel code that works reasonably well for a 
large range of cognitive tasks, but that is not so good to optimally 
perform specific tasks. The reason it is not so good is that it is too 
costly. Alternatively, the symbolic language is cheaper in various 
aspects; it is visually poor, doesn‘t occupy much of working memory, 
and has too little redundancy. Being visually poor means that it takes 
little visual system‘s capacity to be processed, and therefore, much more 
information can be processed through the visual system at the same 
time. The possibility of writing it down on a paper or a computer screen 
also frees the working memory to perform other cognitive tasks – i.e. 
one doesn‘t need to keep the information in the short-term memory to 
accomplish a cognitive task. And the actual status of symbolic language 
– mainly arithmetical language – displays very little redundancy. All of 
these aspects reduce abruptly the processing costs, providing ground for 
larger amounts of information being processed. But what about 
ontology? It is time to get back to our main theme. 
Before stepping on the ontological ground, let me make it clear 
how the previous discussions seem to provide ground for my ontological 
thesis. What I‘ve tried to do in the previous chapters is, first, to show 
how epistemology is grounded on interaction and, second, to highlight 
the contingent character of epistemology as opposite to the unique 
character of action. In the second chapter, the internal experience is 
understood as strategy to improve the organism‘s control over the 
environment. Therefore, internal representation is not a question of 
truth, but of being lead to better action plans. In the third chapter I tried 
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to show that our performance in interacting with environment can tell us 
how good our representations are. And in the next two chapters I‘ve 
tried to show two different strategies that the CNS may have used to 
improve its controlling performance: the first one, choosing bits; the 
second one, changing the channel code. Increasing control means 
getting close to that action plan that minimizes that risk of death. 
Though, while different processing (epistemological) strategies are 
available to the CNS in order to increase our control over the 
environment, only few (if not just one) possible action plans are 
available in order for the organism to stay alive. On one hand, the only 
aspect constraining our epistemological choice is the channel‘s nature 
(cost). On the other hand, what constrains my choice over the possible 
action plans? The answer is: Reality! When moving through the 
environment the organism gives the contours of the reality. When one 
commits a mistake, reality says one is not alone. One gets hurt! Then the 
accident gets its meaning.     
Interactionism, as I refer to it, is a negative and realist ontology. 
The world reveals itself as long as we interact successfully with it. The 
clause ―successfully‖ is important to contrast with the meaning of an 
―accident‖. In the same way a negation implies a whole range of 
possible predicates – e.g. saying ―it is not red‖ entails the possibility of 
―it‖ to instantiate all the colors but red – choosing an action plan that 
results in an accident entails a whole range of possible interactions 
except that one already chosen. However, when interacting successfully 
I can have some faith that to some extent the world is like this. I call it 
negative because it is always virtually possible to choose a 
representation that produces a safer and more complex plan turning the 
contours of reality even more strictly. Whether or not we can know if 
we have arrived at the ultimate (true) contour of reality is a question I 
will leave open. If reality were continuous, then there wouldn‘t be an 
ultimate contour (interaction plan) of the reality. But if it were discrete, 
then there should be some
3
.  However, there will be no ultimate 
representation ever, but only ultimate interaction. 
As a last word, let me say something about the mathematical 
notation used in this dissertation.  Mainly, I will use Information Theory 
and Dynamic (discrete) System Theory to better structure and present 
                                                             
3 This conclusion about discrete versus continuous domains comes from Coding 
Theory. As in a continuous domain the sample space is countless, the probability of 
a specific result goes to zero. Therefore, infinite bits would be needed to perfectly 
represent the information source.    
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my points. The dynamic system‘s notion is taken from Introduction to 
Mathematical System Theory (HEIJ, et al. 2007), while the information 
theory‘s notion is taken from Elements of Information Theory (COVER, 
& THOMAS, 2006). As far as I can see, every model is formally 
defined through my dissertation.  
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2 REALITY AS AN INTERNAL MODEL TO MOTOR 
CONTROL 
In this chapter I present a perspective according to which our 
common conception of reality is found as an internal model to improve 
motor control. More specifically, the model is understood as a strategy 
to correct the corrupted signal used in motor coordination.  First I will 
introduce the metaphor of a dynamic system to interpret the Central 
Nervous System (CNS).  This metaphor gives structure to the ideas that 
(i) the only CNS‘s processing result is motricity and that (ii) our notion 
of reality must be thought of in the intelligent-motricity-production 
context. Second, I‘ll talk about the metaphor of an internal model in 
which (iii) our conception of reality is interpreted. Conforming to this 
interpretation, our subjective experience resides in an internal model of 
the environment created by the CNS in order to correct the transmitted 
signal corrupted by noise.  Last, we will look at some consequences of 
these interpretations.     
2.1 THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM AS A DYNAMIC 
SYSTEM 
 
From a materialist perspective, the brain, which is the CNS‘s 
processing center, is the typical object of reference when talking about 
thinking. However, as soon as one speaks about the brain without any 
reference to CNS, one runs the risk of thinking that one is able to 
  Figure 3 - Central Nervous System 
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understand brain processes dynamics without considering the CNS as a 
whole. The brain, or interneural space, consists of a set of CNS 
subsystems in which events that take place in its space must be 
understood related to the roles they play in the system as a whole 
(MAINZER, 2007).  The term ‗interneural space‘ comes from the fact 
that its neurons transmit information coming from the afferent neurons, 
sensorial organs, to the efferent neurons, motor neurons, resulting in 
muscle contractions (LLINÁS, 2001). The CNS comprises brain and 
spinal cord, which are bilaterally symmetric [Figure 1]. The spinal cord 
receives sensorial information from the skin through a set of long axions 
– the so-called peripheral nervous system and sends motor command to 
muscles (KANDEL, 2012).    
2.2  THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM AS MACHINE WITH 
INPUT 
 
In understanding real entities, different kinds of metaphors can be 
used in order to better conceptualize them – e.g. entities can be viewed 
as little objects, possible worlds, or mathematical fields. A possibility is 
to view the CNS as a dynamic system, which can be intuitively 
understood as any group of elements exhibiting some kind of relation 
(LERNER, 1975; ASHBY, 1956).  More strictly speaking, it can be 
expressed as any set of variables, where each variable is some entity‘s 
feature. The values the system‘s variables assume depend entirely on the 
purposes of the researcher. In the case of the CNS, one can describe it 
from a perspective of either its molecules, or action potential, or 
synapse, or neurons, or nucleus, or circuits, or webs, or maps, or 
systems--hence, central nervous system as a whole.  However, for our 
purposes, it‘s rather preferable to introduce an even more precise 
definition. Denoting the time axis by   and the outcome space for the 
system variables at each time instant by  , we define a (deterministic, 
   ) dynamical system as follows: 
  
Definition 2.1 (dynamical system) A dynamical system consists of a set 
of allowable trajectories of the system variables, i.e., it is characterized 
by its behavior    * |     +. 
     Bearing that in mind, one should ask: what kind of system is the 
CNS?  According to Prigogine (1961), the systems we find in our 
physical reality are divided into three categories, namely: isolated 
systems, the ones that are not able to exchange either energy or matter 
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with environment; closed systems, the ones that exchange energy, but 
not matter with environment; and open systems which exchange energy 
or matter with environment,– clearly the CNS is understood as an open 
system (MAINZER, 2007, p. 98; PRIGOGINE & NICOLIS, 1977).  
From the formal point of view, it would be equivalent to say that the 
system‘s behavior depends on its relationship to the environment – or 
the external variety affecting the system. This kind of system is called 
machine with input (ASHBY, 1970, 1966). We define a machine with 
input in the following way: 
Definition 2.2 (input-output dynamical system) A system with input-
output consists of a set of inputs (parameters) * |     + and a set of 
outputs (trajectories) * |     + related by a function  . The system’s 
behavior is given by   *(   )          ( )+. 
By input one means any external event that is able to modify some 
variables‘ value, while output means any environment‘s change 
produced by the system‘s trajectory (ROSENBLUETH et al, 1943; 
ASHBY, 1970).  This definition is determinist, since each input is 
mapped to only one output, but it is easy to extend the definition to the 
stochastic case (HEIJ et al., 2007).  
Graphic 1 depicts the way each system‘s trajectory is related to a 
distinct input. Each colored line represents a distinct system‘s behavior 
related to each distinct input.  The set of its possible behaviors is called, 
canonical representation. The main aim in enquiring about a specific 
system is to determine its canonical representation.  That being said,  
38 
 
 
cases where one is able to completely figure out a system‘s canonical 
representation are rare, if in fact they exist.  At the beginning, every 
system presents itself as a black box and mostly what one is able to find 
out is just an approximation of its ‗real‘ canonical representation 
(ASHBY, 1970; MAINZER, 2007). 
2.3  The cns as a black box: looking for the machine’s structure 
 
Black Box is a term used to describe a strategy for handling these 
veiled entities – which are a rule rather than an exception. The CNS is a 
typical example of a system for which one cannot directly access its 
transition of state. According to the Black Box theory, the right strategy 
consists in laying down the input and output sets and submitting the 
system to continuous disturbances. By repeating this procedure one 
looks for establishing the relation between each particular input and 
output in order to grasp a satisfying representation of the system‘s 
behavior, which doesn‘t need to be determined but, commonly, is a 
stochastic one. A ‗disturbance‘ occurs when the system is affected by 
different inputs in a given span of time. Because one is mainly interested 
in the behavior‘s representation, this approach is also called behaviorist.  
Graphic 1 - Canonical representation of system's behavior. Each line  
represents s different system‘s trajectory or behavior. 
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Let us assume that the CNS is an open system, therefore the 
following aspects seem to be the case. From a physiologic and anatomic 
point of view, the kind of output resulting from the CNS‘s dynamics is 
exclusively motricity–a part of the glandular and neuro-humoral by-
products (KANDEL, 2012; FUSTER, 2006; LLINAS, 2001; ARBIB, 
1981; SPERRY, 1952).  In other words, motricity is the only way 
whereby the organism is able to affect the environment. According to 
Roger Sperry, ―the entire output of our thinking machine consists of 
nothing but patterns of motor coordination, […] the only significant 
energy outlet and the only means of expression are over the motor 
pathways‖ (italics in original)(1952, pp. 296-298).  From the 
psychological point of view, there seems to be a privilege of action over 
thought. Research about how the CNS reacts to sudden disturbs have 
shown that the sensorial system responds 100ms later than the motor 
system in some situations – such as bouncing a ball, braking the car in 
order to avoid a crash, and diverting an obstacle (EAGLEMANN, 2012; 
LLINÁS, 2001). From a phylogenetic point of view, moving down the 
evolutionary scale, one can notice that the purely mental activity 
becomes much less significant when compared with motor activity – the 
notion of ‗mental‘ should be understood as ‗neural activity without 
immediate motor correlate‘. On the other hand, moving higher up in the 
evolutionary scale, one can find just a gradual sophistication of the brain 
mechanisms without any radical change in the fundamental brain 
principals (SPERRY, 1952). 
Still, from the phylogenetic point of view, the existence of a 
creature, the primitive Ascidiacea, tunicates or ―sea squirts,‖ has been 
interpreted by neuroscientists and evolutionary biologists as a proof of 
the current conjecture about the CNS‘s function. The adult form of this 
creature is sessile, rooted by its pedicle to a stable object in the sea. The 
sea squirt carries out two basic functions in its life: it feeds by filtering 
seawater, and it reproduces by budding. The larval form is briefly free-
swimming and is equipped with a brain-like ganglion containing 
approximately 300 cells. This primitive nervous system receives sensory 
information about the environment through a statocyst (organ of 
balance), a rudimentary, light-sensitive patch of skin, and a notochord 
(primitive spinal cord). These features allow this tadpole-like creature to 
handle the vicissitudes of the ever-changing world within which it 
swims. The surprising fact about this creature is that, as soon as it finds 
a suitable substrate, the larva proceeds to bury its head into the selected 
location and the larva absorbs—literally digests—most of its own brain, 
including its notochord, therefore, becoming a sessile creature once 
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again. It also digests its tail and tail musculature, thereupon regressing to 
the rather primitive adult stage: sessile and lacking a true nervous 
system (LLINAS, 2001; CLONEY, 1982). According to the current 
position, the lesson here is that the evolutionary development of a 
nervous system is an exclusive property of actively moving creatures. 
2.4  THE CNS AS A COMPLEX SYSTEM 
 
In most cases a system can be decomposed in a set of subsystems 
connected among them.  Whether or not this decomposing process has a 
limit is an open question which has to do with the ultimate character of 
reality. Therefore, a system,     is able to be decomposed into two 
simpler systems,   and  , so that   *          + and   
*          + are the variables defining each system respectively – for 
simplicity, both systems are assumed to be discrete  [Figure 2].  Very 
importantly, as one can proceed almost indefinitely dividing a system 
into its subsystems and arranging them as system and environment it 
turns out that the way whereby one sets these notions is strictly arbitrary 
– in fact, there should be an ultimate way to set these notions if reality is 
discrete. Based on this view we can define the notion of environment.       
Definition 2.3 (environment) We call environment the subset     
*      
       +  of   ’s variables whose change modifies the  ’ 
variable values at some extent.   
     The systems we usually find in real life are complex systems 
composed of innumerable subsystems, such as rocks, tools, and 
biological organisms. Surprisingly, as soon as innumerable systems are 
coupled together these systems begin to display curious characteristics. 
For example, as long as any transmission in real life exhibits some 
quantity of quantum or thermodynamic noise, the system‘s dynamics 
Figure 4 - W system composed of subsystems Z and Y. 
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acquires a stochastic feature. Therefore, determined descriptions get 
excluded, which decreases or sometimes precludes the possibility of 
prediction. Eventually, the increasing of complexity gives rise to 
parameter of order from the interaction of these simpler subsystems. 
However, the parameters of order themselves show to be irreducible to 
the simpler subsystems‘ properties and they interact causally with its 
simpler components. This irreducibility is termed non-linearity, and the 
causal interaction with subsystems is termed downward causation. Such 
systems composed of innumerable subsystems and with non-linear 
dynamics are called complex system (MAINZER, 2007; MITCHELL, 
2009). 
It is important to take into consideration the notion of ‗complex 
system‘ in order to make it clear that the characteristics displayed by the 
complex systems don‘t preclude the use of dynamics system theory as a 
model for these systems – the theory also permits us to treat stochastic 
and non-linear systems. All the systems in real life are open systems 
constantly exchanging matter and energy with environment, which 
means that, strictly speaking, any system cannot be excluded from its 
interactional context. This idea seems to be lurking in Wiener‘s words: 
―[…] the structure of the machine or of the organism is an index of the 
performance that may be expected from it.‖ (1989, p. 57).  In other 
words, it‘s fair enough to see our internal representations as a CNS‘s 
middle-step processing stage in the production of motricity once the 
latter is its main purpose. If one is in agreement with this digression, 
then one can maintain that any research about how our subjective 
experience grasps the outside world cannot be thought out of the 
intelligent-motricity-production context. This perspective leads us to 
inquire as to the function of the Central Nervous System, and why 
moving organisms need such a system in order to survive? 
2.5  The Living Organism 
 
What role is played by the Central Nervous System in the biological 
organism as a whole?  Not all biological organisms are gifted with a 
CNS. Plants, which have appeared late in the life-diversification 
process, seem to have chosen simply not to have a CNS and still they 
have been having great success as a specie (LLINÁS, 2001).  In a 
special class of them, the CNS‘s role seems to be strictly related to the 
control of the organism‘s life.   
According to definition 1.2, the organism, interpreted as a dynamic 
system, is characterized by certain behavior, which can be defined as a 
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set of possible trajectories   *(   )          ( )+ over a 
phase space, where   is the set of possible trajectories,   is a set of 
inputs,   is the set of outputs, and   is a set of functions relating each 
input to some output.  The input set   and the output set   can be 
viewed as a random variable vector producing, at any time  , an input 
 ( )  (  ( )     ( ))
 
  and an output  ( )  .  ( )     ( )/
 
 so 
that the system‘s dynamics is given by the following equations 
 (   )    ( )    ( )                                                                     ( ) 
 ( )    ( )    ( )                                                                            ( ) 
Notice that the equation (1) can be plugged in the equation (2), 
therefore, representing the function      ,  ,  , and   are matrices of 
suitable dimension and the variable   is a state variable, which contains 
all past relevant information for a future transition. The set of   inputs 
can be understood as another   system‘s output set which is causally 
related with   system. Nonetheless, usually different inputs,   ( ) e 
  ( ) for      , when added to the same state   , tend to conduct the 
system through different trajectories   ( ) e   ( ) para    .  Therefore, 
if   ( ) is for an automobile and   ( ) is for a soccer ball, both in 
collision course with someone‘s body, the outputs   ( ) and   ( ) will 
surely be different. Keeping that in mind, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that there will be, among the trajectories in    , a subset of trajectories 
    which represents the system‘s desired trajectories – the 
organism alive! In other words, the set of desired trajectories in the 
output set   represent those vectors  ( ) whose component values 
correspond to some ideal values – e.g. the body‘s temperature around 
36ºC, the pressure of blood between 100 and 140 mmHg, etc.  The 
suggestion is that the biological organism wouldn‘t survive, if it were 
depending entirely on luck.  
By way of the equation (2) one can notice that the system‘s 
trajectory  ( ) depends on the state   where the system is found. It 
means that if there were a mechanism that could choose the state   in 
(2), then there would be greater surviving chances. Such mechanisms 
are called control systems. The CNS is interpreted as a control system 
whose main purpose is to keep the whole organism alive. However, how 
is motricity related to the control system‘s purpose, and how can our 
subjective experience contribute to this enterprise?  
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2.6 The CNS as a Control System 
 
A control system consists in a system coupled to another system 
whose function is to bring back to or to keep the controlled system‘s 
trajectory in the domain of desired trajectories .  The control system 
emits a control input  ( ) changing the system‘s state value   so that its 
trajectory         remains in the domain . In general, a cost 
function  (    )    is defined over the summation of a state value 
string, at a span of time  , which measures how much the system‘s 
trajectory deviate from the desired trajectory set . Of course, the 
control system‘s aim is to decrease the cost function value.  
     The control input cannot be randomly emitted in order to reproduce 
the desired trajectory; therefore, the control system chooses the control 
input based upon some information source. There are at least two 
different kinds of information sources and, according to them, two 
different categories of control systems are distinguished, namely: 
extrapolative and non-extrapolative. Non-extrapolative control systems 
base their input choice on the information provided by the controlled 
system‘s state value  (   ) [Figure 5], while extrapolative control 
systems, on the another hand, base their input choice on the information 
provided by an observation  ( ) of the environmental input   ( ). Based 
on the observation, the extrapolative system estimates the environmental 
input  (   ) in order to choose the  (   ) so that   (   )  
  (   )   (   )     (ASHBY, 1956; ROSENBLUETH et al., 
1943; LERNER, 1975; ARBIB, 1981).  
The non-extrapolative systems, which are also called feedback 
systems, choose the control input  (   ) based on the state variable 
value  (   ), for     – in other words, the control system acts on 
the future system‘s trajectory.  For example, shivering, due to the 
feeling of cold, is an organism‘s response to decreasing body 
temperature. As soon as its temperature goes down to 36.5ºC, the CNS 
emits a shivering in order to bring the organism‘s body back to the 
desired temperature.  The main drawback of the non-extrapolative 
systems is that the control input is a function of the future system state 
  (   ). Therefore, for great cost function values the non-
extrapolative control systems might be inefficient to control the 
organism‘s life; if the organism dies, then  (    )    and no control 
input can bring it back to .      
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Figure 3 --Non-extrapolative control system (feedback) 
 
The extrapolative control systems choose the control input  ( )  
through an observation  ( ) of the present environmental input  ( ) in 
order to estimate the future environmental input  (   ) and the likely 
system‘s trajectory  (   ), given the state value  ( ) – i.e. the control 
input  ( ) ought be such that satisfies the following conditions:  (  
 )    ( )    ( ),  (   )    (   )    (   ) and  (  
 )   . Notice that much of the system‘s efficiency depends on the 
observation  ( ).  If the observation has little information or the system 
is unable to efficiently process the observation‘s information, then it 
may misperceive the future environmental input and choose the wrong 
control input causing  (   )   . Extrapolative control systems are 
more efficient then non-extrapolative systems because their control 
input acts anticipatorily on the controlled system. Whereas the non-
extrapolative control system tries to correct the controlled system‘s 
trajectory deviation, the extrapolative control system simple tries to 
avoid the trajectory deviation. 
 The observation  ( ) should contain the relevant information 
for the organism‘s surviving. The entities that typically threaten the 
organism‘s life are moving macroscopic objects. Differently, 
microscopic entities have no, or less, effect on the controlled system‘s 
trajectory. Because the relevant information for the organism‘s life 
contained in the environmental input consists mainly of the 
displacement of macroscopic objects, the control input information 
should have the same nature. That is why the CNS‘s output consists of 
motor twitches; motor information produces that desirable result in 
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terms of spatiotemporal changes. But what is the connection between 
subjectivity and motor output? 
Figure 4 - Extrapolative control system 
 
2.7  The Internal Model of the Environment as a Decoding Strategy 
 
In the extrapolative control systems, the system‘s degree of 
control clearly depends on the system‘s information processing capacity 
to handle the observation   ( )4.  In real life, every 
transmission/processing system is characterized by some amount of 
noise, which is additional information that corrupts the signal. In this 
last session, we will assume that the CNS is an extrapolative control 
system and interpret our common conception of reality as a strategy to 
correct the corrupted signal in the information processing.  
2.7.1 Noise 
 
 Very often, external and internal factors contributing to a 
transmission may negatively interfere with the environmental 
information processing, thereby, impairing the control enterprise. It 
obligates the control system to implement strategies that correct this 
interference. This interference is understood as noise, which is an 
unwanted variety added to the transmission/processing signal
5
. This 
                                                             
4
 The idea of ‗observation‘ can be modeled by using information theory or 
hidden Markovian models (PHAM, 2002; ATTNEAVE, 1954; ROGERS et al. 
1999) 
 
5
 The noise may also be seen from a positive perspective. Along with the 
organism‘s development the presence of noise obligates the organism to 
improve its information processing, therefore, conducting it to its optimal 
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additional variety is defined in contrast with the variety characterizing 
the transmitted message (ASHBY, 1956; SHANNON, 1964). Any 
additional variety that interferes somehow in the transmitted signal 
ought to be considered as noise – hereafter I will refer to the corrupted 
signal as noisy signal. Any noise is undesirable since the control system 
may interpret it as information about the environmental input and end up 
making a wrong decision. 
2.7.2  Time delay  
 
In robotic control systems, the information garnered by the 
transducer devices is transmitted to the control center through electronic 
circuits at a frequency of 500-1000 Hz, with negligible error rate. The 
information transmission in these systems is carried out at a rate of 1-
2ms, making these systems very efficient in making their control 
decisions based directly on the information garnered by their ―sensorial‖ 
transducers. Differently, in the biological systems the information is 
transmitted through electrophysiological processes at a transmission rate 
of 150-250ms (KAWATO, id.; FELDMAN, 2006). As the speed rate of 
our faster movements is 150ms and our intermediate movements is 
500ms, there is a critical time delay that interferes with motor 
coordination. Therefore, it must be considered as noise by the control 
system (KAWATO, id.; NIJHAWAN, 2008). In this case, if the CNS 
were to make its control decision based directly on the in-time 
environmental information provided by the sensorial organs, then we 
wouldn‘t be able to bounce a ball in a tennis game. As the information 
takes a little longer to be transmitted we would always be late bouncing 
it.  It can be concluded, most of what we ―see‖ cannot be directly caused 
by environmental information.  
2.7.3  Intrinsic and extrinsic signal’s corruption factors  
 
In a biological processing system, noise is everywhere; there is 
as much noise in intrinsic as in extrinsic aspects of information 
processing (DESTEXHE & RUDOLPH-LILITH, 2012; FAISAL et al., 
2008; STEIN et al. 2005; WOLPERT et al. 2003).  Nowadays, one of 
the most challenging problems in neuroscience is making a clear 
                                                                                                                                 
performance. From this positive perspective, a certain amount of noise is a 
desirable feature in the evolutionary process. The total absence of noise causes 
its underdevelopment; too much noise causes its demise; the right amount of 
noise causes its optimal performance.   
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distinction between noise and relevant information.  As long as one 
doesn‘t know what the brain‘s code is yet, one can be treating noise as 
information and conversely.  Until recently, temporal variety in the 
neural transmission has been treated as noise, but now there seems to be 
strong evidence supporting the idea that the temporal variety is rather 
relevant information for control (FAISAL et al., id).   
There are extrinsic noise factors to the CNS in every sensorial 
modality. The photons impinging on the retina don‘t arrive at the 
photoreceptor cells exhibiting a perfect pattern – this process has been 
currently modeled as a Poisson Process (PIRENNE, 1959). The sound 
waves impinging on the hair cells in the auditory system are subject to 
Brownian Movement, which creates some randomness consistent with 
noise (HARRIS, 1968). Likewise, the chemical sensorial transducers are 
subject to thermodynamic randomness which is also consistent with 
noise (BERG & PURCELL, 1977; BIALEK & SETAYESHGAR, 
2005). The neural cells‘ potential membrane is characterized by some 
degree of randomness which continually changes the action potential 
limit. Sometimes the action potential occurs even in the absence of pre-
synaptic activity, or simply doesn‘t respond to the pre-synaptic input 
(DIBA et al. 2004). This randomness, owing partially to the ion channel 
noise, increases inversely proportional to the cell‘s size, since the 
membrane‘s input resistance increases quickly as its diameter decreases 
(RALL, 1969; FAISAL et al., 2005). The signal emitted through long 
axions has a high transmission failure rate, around 50-80% (DEBANNE, 
2004). These examples give us an idea about how noise is present at 
different stages of the neural processing, and how these noises 
eventually end up affecting perception, cognition, and motor 
coordination.  
2.8  The internal model as an error-correction strategy       
 
In order to remove temporal and other forms of noise from a 
signal, some strategy is needed. The current hypothesis is that the CNS 
elaborates an internal model, an emulator, of the external events which 
makes an estimation of the future environmental inputs based on the 
statistical structure of the process (GRUSH, 2004; DESMURGET & 
GRAFTON, 2000; KAWATO, 1999; WOLPERT,1995). The estimation 
is made through the observations   of the input sequence   . The control 
system doesn‘t choose its control input based directly on environmental 
input information, but on the information provided by the internal model 
– notice that the information provided directly by the sensorial 
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transducers would be information about a past event because of 
processing time delay. The suppositions here are that (i) the source has a 
stationary structure and that (ii) the source sample garnered through the 
observation has a sufficient statistic about the input process. Mistakes 
are possible because eventually the control system has no sufficient 
statistics to estimate the correct environmental input or because it just 
doesn‘t have the capacity to process the whole amount of information 
provided by the observation.  
As the control system‘s guessing task depends on the statistical 
structure of the process, it depends on the experience.  It is like trying to 
find out whether or not a dice is biased; there is no other way than 
throwing the dice continually until there is a representative sample of 
the process‘ statistical structure.  In most of cases, all the possible events 
are not equally likely to occur – as a matter of fact, they are not in our 
world. Therefore, given that a specific event has occurred, it changes the 
probability of the next possible events. This statistical perspective on 
perception has had much success in explaining illusion and motor 
planning. As the interpretation implies, what we see is much based on 
our experience and is an estimation of the future – and therefore 
eventually ends up as a mistake induced by previous events. It is as if 
the perceptual data doesn‘t give the content, but just modulates the 
internal model‘s dynamics (LLINÁS, 1992, 2001, 2009; GRUSH, 2004; 
CHURCHLAND et al. 1994). In the same vein, probabilistic decision 
theory (Bayesian) has matched in a great deal with the way we really 
make decisions in our daily situation (WOLPERT & GHAHRAMANI, 
2009; DOYA et al. 2007; SHADMEHR & MUSSA-IVALDI, 2012). 
The evidences supporting such interpretation are also found in 
neuroimaging experiments that suggest the existence of neural circuits 
grounding such emulators (JORDAN & RUMELHAR, 1992; MIALL et 
al. 1993; WOLPERT, 1995; FLANAGAN & WING, 1997; SNYDER, 
1999; MERFELD et al. 1999; KAWATO, 1999; DESMURGET & 
GRAFTON, 2000; GRUSH, 2004).  
2.9  The Internal Model as a Motor Parameter 
 
The idea, according to which our subjective experience is viewed 
as a strategy to remove the noise from the signal, has still a more precise 
interpretation.   In this more precise interpretation, the so-called strategy 
is a channel code; i.e. it is a structure that the signal assumes in order to 
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better transmit the information and surmount the noise
6
. The perceptual 
categories –colors, forms, and so on – are viewed as particularities of 
the transmission code.  However, the variety, or degrees of freedom, 
expressed in the transmission must convey the source properties. The 
code‘s particularities are contingent; they depend on the signal used and 
the kind of channel. However, the complexity is mandatory; it must 
respect the source complexity in order to achieve the control aim. A 
good code conveys the source information respecting the channel-cost 
capacity.  
 According to this more precise interpretation, a control input 
 ( ) results from the processing of information contained in the 
observation  ( ). As the control input consists of motor twitches and the 
code words of internal representations, our representations are better 
understood as a pre-motor parameter.  As such, the complexity of our 
plans depends on the complexity of our representations
7
. The ―pre‖ in 
pre-motor means that not every bit corresponds to an action – not every 
representation ends up in action.  From this point of view, it doesn‘t 
make sense to ask whether a given code word corresponds to a given 
source bit – in other words, there is no sense in asking whether an object 
is blue or green. The optimum code just needs to express the source‘s 
degrees of freedom respecting the channel capacity – whether it is 
accomplished by means of binary electrical pulses or ternary mechanic 
hits is contingent. Two distinct channel codes can convey the same 
information and still use transmission signals completely distinct. 
Therefore, one can pass by the obsessive search for the representation of 
reality and search for the degrees of freedom of the reality.   
2.10 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I presented an alternative according to which our 
common notion of reality is understood as an internal model elaborated 
by the CNS in order to improve the biological organism‘s surviving 
chances.  More specifically, the internal model is viewed as a strategy to 
remove the noise from the transmission/processing signal. As the CNS‘s 
main purpose is to preserve the organism‘s life through motor 
coordination, the ultimate function of our notion of reality cannot be one 
of ―represent‘ or ―stand for something‖ out there. In order to be coherent 
with the organism‘s structure it has to be inquired in its connection with 
                                                             
6
 See chapter four for a complete discussion of this point. 
7
 See chapter four for a complete discussion of this point. 
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motor output. As a result, on the one hand, the philosophical endeavor to 
fill the gap between reality and representation is simply a mistake, if one 
doesn‘t admit a missing piece between these two poles. On the other 
hand, the ultimate contact with reality cannot be through representation, 
whether subjective images or abstracts structures, but motor 
interactions.  
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3 THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM AS INFORMATION 
PROCESSING SYSTEM: DO WE HAVE ACCESS TO THE 
ENTIRE OUTSIDE REALITY? 
In this chapter I will introduce a formal framework in order to give 
thorough treatment to the question: Do we have access to the entire 
outside reality? In this enterprise, the Central Nervous System (CNS) 
will be interpreted as an information processing system and the question 
will be translated in terms of the quantity of reliably processed 
information.  A measure of the quantity of information reliably 
processed by the CNS will be defined in terms of the probability of 
error, or accident, in interacting with the environment.  According to the 
defined measure, no accident will be viewed as optimal information 
processing performance and the presence of any error will be valued as 
suboptimal information processing performance. Since accidents are 
never completely preventable, the CNS seems not to be processing 
entire outside information. However, rather than seriously answering the 
above question, the main aim of this chapter is to provide a framework 
in which the philosophical question can be made stricter and its answer 
connected with the experimental data provided by empirical sciences.  
3.1  A Brief Overview of Information Theory 
 
From an intuitive point of view, the main idea underpinning 
information theory is that of measuring the degrees of freedom whereby 
a system  can affect another system  . The idea of degrees of freedom 
is grasped through the idea of ‗surprise‘ so that the greater surprise 
concerning the   system‘s output, the higher the freedom with which it 
can affect the   system. Because this picture matches exactly with the 
requirements necessary for communication it is called, Information 
Theory (SHANNON & WEAVER, 1964). From the mathematical point 
of view, the notion of ‗surprise‘ can be conceptualized as a distribution 
of probability  ( ), and a measure function   is defined which gives the 
quantity of surprise. The   function has to respect intuitive conditions of 
the notion of surprise, such as: first, there is no surprise in hearing that 
an event sure to occur has indeed occurred; second, the more unlikely an 
event is to occur, the greater is the surprise evoked by its occurrence 
(monotonicity); third, one would intuitively expect a small change in 
 ( ) to correspond to a small change in  ( ) –  i.e.  ( ) is a continuous 
function of  ( ); and finally, the surprise characterizing independent 
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events is additive. It is easy to prove that the log function        
matches these conditions, where   is the base-change logarithm constant 
– if    , then one refers to the quantity of surprise in terms of bits 
(ROSS, 1998; COVER & THOMAS, 2006). To measure the entire 
system‘s degrees of freedom one has to average over each surprise 
measure        , which is called, Entropy of a given source/system.  
Definition 3.1. (Entropy) Given a distribution of probability  ( ) over 
some finite sample space , the entropy of  is defined by  
 
 ( )   , ( )-   ∑  ( )     ( )
 
 
 
the log is to base 2  and the entropy is expressed in bits.   
Very importantly, the function  ( ) depends exclusively on 
the probability distribution  ( ), irrespectively of what each  (  ) is 
for. 
Returning to the situation in which the environment   affects 
the system                the random variables   and   and the 
respective distributions of probability  ( ) and  ( ), and  (   ), 
which are the marginal probabilities of the random variables     and 
   , and the joint probabilities that     occurs whenever     
occurs, so that     and    . Thus,   is the set of all possible 
values (or assignments) to  . The notation ∑    means summation over 
all    , and |  | stands for the cardinality of  .  As long as the 
entropy is defined for some value of probability  ( ), different notions 
of entropy are defined according to different distributions of probability, 
and along these lines different meanings as well.  If  ( )   ( ), then 
  is for the source information uncertainty and  ( ) refers to the 
quantity of information contained in the source. If  ( )   (   ), then 
the joint entropy  (   ) refers to the uncertainty characterizing the 
whole system‘s behavior. If  ( )   ( | ), so that  ( | )  
 (  )
 ( )
, 
then the conditional entropy  ( |  ) is the uncertainty in  ‘s input 
since the  ‘s output is   .  Notice that there will be | | conditional 
entropies  ( |  ), therefore one has to average over the  ( ) in order 
to produce a unique measure,  ( | )  ∑  ( )∑  ( |  )
| |
     The 
meaning of these former notions can be better understood through the 
scheme shown in [Figure 5].  
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Figure 5 Simplified Communication System 
 
In the typical communication system, the system   stands for 
the communication channel, while the environment   stands for the 
source information. The source emits an input signal    according to a 
distribution  ( ) that is transmitted through the channel resulting in an 
output   . The channel is defined as a matrix of conditional distribution 
 ( | ) and the uncertainty inherent to the transmission is grasped 
through the conditional entropy  ( | ). The subtraction of the source 
entropy  ( ) minus the uncertainty  ( | ) gives the quantity of 
information processed by the system – or the quantity of information 
reliably transmitted – which is defined as the mutual information 
 (   ). 
Definition 3.2. (Mutual Information) Given a source distribution  ( ) 
and a joint distribution  (   ), the mutual information between two 
random variables   and   is defined as    
 (   )  ∑ (   )    
 (   )
 ( ) ( )
  
 
The above definition measures the distance between the two variables   
and  . The more statistically dependent are the variables   and  , the 
higher the mutual information values obtained.  Notice that if the 
variables   and   are statistically independent, then the mutual 
information equals zero. It is easy to prove that  (   )   ( )  
 ( | )  it follows from the above definition (COVER & THOMAS, 
2006).  
 In general, the source information cannot directly affect the 
channel, as they are different entities. Therefore, a more accurate 
description is to represent the source as a different random variable   
and a distribution  ( ), and the channel exclusively as a matrix of 
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conditional distribution  ( | ). The source   generates a sequence   
which is merged in the channel input  . In the same way, the channel 
cannot directly affect the environment, thus the channel‘s output   is 
decoded as a source representation  ̂ [Figure 6].  Commonly, there is 
also some noise disturbing the transmission through the channel, which 
is symbolized by the variable  . In this new picture, one is able to notice 
the coding and decoding functions (   ) which are called the source-
channel code. The source-channel code can still be divided as different 
instances, namely, the source code and the channel code. The first 
would try to eliminate the source redundancy, while the second to add 
structured redundancy in order to combat the channel noise.  However, 
focusing attention on just the source-channel code will suffice.    
 
 
Figure 6 Information System 
 
Many important results are provided by the above conceptual 
scheme. Among them Shannon has proved that: the lower bound for the 
lossless source code representation is the source entropy  ( ) (Source 
Coding Theorem); the information can be reliably transmitted through a 
noisy channel by using arbitrarily long length channel codes (Channel 
Coding Theorem); the source coding and the channel coding process can 
be accomplished in completely separate stages being still asymptotically 
optimal (Source-Channel Separation Theorem); the best rate   that a 
code can achieve for a fixed distortion value   is given by the Rate-
Distortion Function  ( )    Shannon, and the latest research,  show that 
there are numerous additional results (SHANNON, 1948, 1964; 
COVER, & THOMAS, 2006; EL GAMAL & KIM 2011). At this 
juncture, the main engineering endeavor concerns the devise of optimal 
codes and, sometimes, suitable channels. On the one hand, the main 
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theoretical results establish the contours (or bounds) of the optimal 
communication systems. Very importantly, the theory doesn‘t explain 
how to transmit information optimally, but it gives the bounds of 
optimality.  On the other hand, it doesn‘t describe how some 
information is being processed (which functions are carrying out the 
process), but only whether or not it is being processed optimally.   It 
may sound pessimist because the formal method doesn‘t tell which 
functions accomplish the information processing, however, it is very 
interesting because it gives the system‘s contours without getting into 
those fine-grained problems.     
3.2  Rate-Distortion Problem 
 
Previously, Figure 6 showed the transmission process in which 
the source   is encoded in a channel input code  , transmitted/processed 
through the channel/processor  ( | ), and decoded as a source 
representation  ̂.  However, every transmission process in real life has 
some cost – like energy and time – and as the amount of a source‘s 
information increases, a perfect representation of the source becomes 
more demanding. The costs limit the channel capacity and they force 
one to limit the amount of information processed. Very often this limit 
ends up affecting the quality of the source representation, which will 
result in some distortion. When this happens, some bits of information 
will be lost while others will be reliably transmitted. The scene just 
described is the Rate-Distortion problem, which is informally captured 
by the following question: at fixed power budget, what is the highest 
quality at which the source can be represented at the end point? 
3.2.1 Formal statement of the problem 
 
To better understand the rate-distortion problem the previous 
italicized concepts,  ‗cost‘, ‗channel capacity‘, ‗quality‘, and 
‗distortion‘, will have to undergo a more formal treatment. Therefore, let 
us introduce some definitions.  The notions of cost and distortion are 
expressed in the following functions: 
Definition 3.3 (Distortion Function) A Distortion Function, or 
distortion measure, is a mapping  
                                     ̂                                           1.1. 
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from the set of source alphabet-reproduction alphabet pairs into the set 
of nonnegative real numbers. 
Definition 3.4 (Cost Function) A channel input cost function is a 
mapping  
                                                                                             1.2 
from the set of input alphabet into the set of nonnegative real numbers.  
 According to these definitions both cost and distortion are a 
measure of a certain kind.  Since we will very often be interested in 
sequences of source symbols and channels signals, it‘s convenient to 
define cost and distortion for sequences, rather than only for single 
letters. Therefore: 
Definition 3.5 (Distortion Between Sequences   and  ̂) The distortion 
between sequences   and  ̂ is the expected value of the sequence 
   (    ̂ )    (    ̂ )  
 
 
∑  (    ̂ )
 
                            1.3 
 Definition 3.6 (Input Sequence Cost) The cost of an input sequence 
   is defined as  
          (  )    (  )  
 
 
∑ (  )                                        1.4. 
The representation‘s quality and the channel capacity are both 
defined in terms of how much information is reliably transmitted 
whether by the channel output   or by the source representation  ̂ – i.e. 
in terms of mutual information between both  (   ̂) and  (   ), above 
defined.  
Definition 3.7 (Channel Capacity) The “information” channel 
capacity of a discrete 
memoryless channel is defined as 
                                             ( )  (   )                           1.5 
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions  ( ).
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The representation‘s quality is defined solely as the mutual 
information between   and  ̂; i.e.  (   ̂), but notice that the two former 
definitions are not satisfactory as they stand! On the one hand, as the 
channel input distribution  ( ) depends on the source distribution  ( ) 
through the encoding function  , the transmission‘s costs can exceed the 
channel‘s physical limits, if no constraint is fixed. On other hand, when 
the channel limits the representation‘s quality so that one is forced  to 
decrease  (   ̂), the  (   ̂) can be rendered zero, if no constraint is 
fixed as well – for example, encoding every source symbols    to the 
same channel input   . The new definitions that arise from these 
amendments are the Rate-Distortion Function and the Capacity-Cost 
Function. 
Definition 3.8 (Capacity-Cost Function) The capacity-cost function of 
the channel ( ( | )  ) is defined as 
                 ( )      ( )   ( )   (   )                                   1.6. 
Definition 3.9 (Rate-Distortion Function) The rate-distortion function 
of the source ( ( )  ) is defined as  
                  ( )      (   ̂)   (   ̂)   (   ̂)                                1.7 
Figure 7 Rate-Distortion Function 
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According to the new definitions of channel capacity and 
representation‘s quality, the achievable channel capacity is restricted by 
the cost value  , and the reduction of the representation‘s quality is 
restricted by some distortion value  . The rate distortion function is a 
non-increasing convex function of the conditional distribution  (   ̂) 
[Figure 7]. The rate-distortion curve describes optimal channel codes so 
that the minimum rate is achievable for a fixed distortion value. The 
area above the curve are the pairs (   ) trivially achievable, and the 
area under the curve are the pairs (   ) unachievable irrespective of 
(   ). 
Since the channel input distribution  ( ) depends on the  ( ) 
through the encoding function   and the joint distribution    (   ̂) 
depends on the channel  ( | )  through the encoding and decoding 
 (   ), it becomes clear that there is a trade-off between the cost P and 
the distortion  : The more cost one can use on the channel, the smaller 
distortion one can achieve. This trade-off is grasped by the following 
pair of values.  
Definition 3.10 (Cost-Distortion Pair) For a fixed source ( ( )  ), a 
fixed channel ( (  | )  ) and a fixed code (   ), the cost-distortion 
pair (   ) is given by (1.3) and (1.4), respectively. 
For a given source ( ( )  ) and a given channel ( ( | )  ), there is an 
entire set of pairs (   ) achievable by means of different coding 
schemes (   ) [Figure 8]. The cost-distortion curve as drawn in Figure 
8 is the union of the pairs (P,D) satisfying 
Figure 8 Distortion- Trade-Off Cost  
61 
 
                  ( )                 ( )    (   ̂)                            1.8 
With pairs (   ) satisfying  
                   ( )                 (   ̂)    ( )                            1.9 
Notice that the minimization depends on the channel code 
(   ). The points on the cost-distortion curve give, for every distortion 
 , the smallest possible cost  , and conversely, for every cost  , the 
smallest possible distortion   – what comprise the optimal coding 
schemes (   ). The area above the curve gives all the trivially 
achievable pairs (P,D), while the area under the curve gives all 
unachievable pairs (P,D). 
 Shannon has proved the bounds for these notions in terms of the 
Source-Channel Separation Theorem (SHANNON, 1948; COVER & 
THOMAS, 2006; EL GAMAL & KIM, 2011). The theorem acclaims 
that the channel-cost capacity bounds that quantity of source 
information reliably transmitted – i.e.  ( )   ( )   In other words, if 
the source entropy  ( )   ( ), then there is a channel code (   ) 
such that     for a fixed cost   – i.e.  ( )   ( ) is achievable. 
Otherwise, if  ( )   ( ), then the distortion   is bounded above zero 
irrespective of (   ). The operational version of the theorem says that 
the maximum rate of source bits that can be safely compressed is upper 
bounded by the channel-cost capacity  ( ). 
Still another way to look to the same problem is through the 
Distortion-Rate Function  ( ), which is the inverse function of the 
Rate-Distortion Function. The distortion-rate function is defined as 
follows: 
Definition 3.11 (Distortion-Rate Function) The distortion-rate 
function of the source  ( ) and a given rate   is defined as  
                  ( )      (   ̂)  (   ̂)    (   ̂)                                1.9 
The distortion-rate function gives the smaller distortion   for a 
fixed rate   
 
 
 where   is for bits per source symbol and   is for 
number of channel‘s use. At the same time, for a fixed rate   and 
channel code (   ), the function gives a specific distortion value  . 
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 Now, through these sets of formal definitions, the informal 
question at the beginning of the discussion is translated in the following 
way: Given a channel-cost capacity  ( ) and source  ( ), what is the 
smallest distortion achievable?  Or even: given a channel-cost capacity 
 ( ), a source  ( ), and a coding scheme (   ), what distortion value 
  is achievable?  Is this coding scheme optimal? Is this coding scheme 
at least good enough to achieve a desirable distortion value  ?  This last 
question will become the most fertile.  
3.3  Central Nervous System as a Communication Channel 
 
I will use the same formal method of investigation to determine 
whether or not the 
Central Nervous System (CNS) is able to process all the information 
coming from the environment.  The aim is not to seriously defend one or 
another position, since empirical evidence shows that the CNS doesn‘t 
experience all information available from the outside world (FRITH, 
2007; EAGLEMAN, 2011; GREGORY, 2009), but rather to setup a 
framework in which old problems will be treated in a different way – 
hopefully!   
 In order to assess the CNS‘s processing capacity it will be 
viewed as a communication channel. Very importantly, the only 
requirement to interpret something as a communication channel is that it 
can be viewed as two statistically dependent (or more) points. The CNS 
seems to meet this requirement since the sensorial pathway and the 
pyramidal motor trait can both be interpreted as the random variables   
and   with a set of distribution of probability  ( | ) characterizing 
their statistical dependence. The environmental information, which 
includes our own body, is defined as the source information   and the 
set of all possible muscular twitches as the source‘s representation  ̂ – 
more precisely, both variables   and  ̂ will be a vector random variable. 
Our sensorial organs and the biological transducers, along with the early 
stages of perceptual processing, will be interpreted as the encoding 
function   whereas the decoding function   will be some process 
accomplished in the primary motor cortex (KANDEL, et al. 2000).  
Assuming that the different ways through which a cognitive task is 
accomplished, either the biological apparatus of cognition or cultural 
strategies as symbolic employment, are different coding schemes(   ) 
(a detailed defense of this point will be done in the Fifth Chapter).        
 The CNS‘s information processing has different kinds of costs 
ranging from catabolic costs to time processing costs. The CNS 
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consumes the average of 20% of energy generated in the catabolic 
process, which means that its information processing is a very expensive 
one to the organism (KANDEL, et al. 2000). On the other hand, since it 
is a control system and the environment is ever changing, information 
processing time is a very important matter – delay may cost the 
organism‘s life. Therefore, a cost function    restricts the CNS‘s 
information processing capacity in terms of energy and time delay. The 
crux is to find out whether or not the CNS‘s capacity  ( ) and their 
various coding schemes (   ) are able to process all environmental 
information – i.e. whether    . Clearly it is a case for a distortion-rate 
function (definition 1.9), in which, at a fixed rate    ( ) and a fixed 
channel code (   ), it maps to a distortion value  8. To complete the 
setup a specific distortion function  (   ̂) is missing. 
 Suppose the source   is a system composed of a finite number 
of variables, a fair supposition as it is a logical consequence of the 
question at stake.  Because interest is only in finding out whether all the 
source information is being reliably processed, a Hamming Distortion 
Function seems to be in order.    
Definition 3.12 (Hamming Distortion Function) A Hamming 
distortion function is given by  
                                  (   ̂)  {
        ̂
        ̂
                                 1.10 
which results in a probability of error distortion, since   (   ̂)  
   (   ̂).    
Interpreting the Hamming distortion function as an Accident 
Function so that 0 means a successful action and 1 means an accident, a 
sequence of sensorial input   is processed through the CNS resulting in 
sequences of actions  ̂. The average distortion is calculated according 
the definition 1.3 resulting in a probability of error. If the CNS is 
processing all the environmental information, then the distortion value 
  goes to zero – i.e. the probability of error. Notice that measuring the 
information processing capacity in terms of successful action is in 
perfect harmony with standard cognitive tests. At almost any 
                                                             
8
 Notice that the distortion-rate function minimizes the distortion measure over 
the entire set of joint distributions  (   ̂). However, it is an easier task to 
calculate the function for a particular distribution  (   ̂)  which is the joint 
distribution of the particular channel code (   ) . 
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experimental setup the evaluation of the patient‘s performance is based 
on his motor feedback. If the source is continuous, then no 
representation can be perfect.  The question at stake has no sense 
(COVER & THOMAS, 2006).  
.  To calculate the distortion-rate function, one must have the 
source distribution  ( ), CNS‘s processing capacity  ( ) which is the 
rate  .  However, as we are not interested in the ideal situation of 
optimal coding schemes for a fixed source distribution and rate   
 ( ), we can just measure empirically the representation‘s distortion in 
order to evaluate the system‘s performance. The history of humanity is 
also the history of the measurement of the CNS‘s performance in 
finding a better action plan to handle environmental information.  It is 
clear that in any moment of history, whether using scientific knowledge 
or not, we have never been able to avoid accident in our interactions, 
whether grasping a class, driving a car, or launching a spacecraft.  Based 
on these considerations I conclude that the CNS is not processing the 
whole environmental information.    
3.4  What Are the Future Problems in This Picture? 
 
In the previous discussion I‘ve modeled the CNS as a communication 
channel and have measured its processing capacity with a distortion 
function, namely, the so-called accident function. The accident function 
measures the CNS‘s processing capacity in terms of the right action plan 
for a given environmental situation. Therefore, the accident function 
emerges as a system‘s measure of control; by decreasing the distortion 
value  , one is increasing the system‘s control upon the environment. 
There are at least two reasons why the distortion value is above zero 
(   ), namely: The channel-cost capacity might be smaller than the 
source entropy – i.e.  ( )   ( ); the coding schemes employed by 
the CNS might be suboptimal. 
Beginning with the second reason, the coding schemes being 
suboptimal means that the distortion value   can be smaller than the one 
presented by the system for a fixed cost   (GASTPAR, 2002). In fact 
there is no reason to suppose that biological evolution has endowed an 
optimal coding scheme, but rather with a good-enough coding scheme – 
i.e. a coding scheme good enough to survive.  As to the first reason, 
Shannon has already proved the quantity of source information reliably 
processed is upper bounded by the channel-cost capacity  ( ).  Even 
though currently there seems to be no indisputable CNS‘s measure of 
capacity, there are a lot of empirical facts which support the belief that 
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there is much more environmental information than our CNS is able to 
process.  To give a simple example, we perceive only 0,0035% of the 
whole spectrum of light, and the encoding of this tiny portion is still a 
lossy one – i.e. the colors and hues we perceive are much less 
informative than the information contained in every color length wave 
range (GEGENFURTNER & SHARPE, 2001).  Accordingly, it will be 
treated as a lossy compression case.  
 By treating a lossy compression case, in which all the source 
bits cannot be processed, the main problem is how to tell the right 
source bits from the irrelevant ones. In this case, our distortion measure 
cannot help anymore and new models must be devised – notice that the 
Hamming distortion doesn‘t discriminate any source bit. The main 
problem will be to devise models in which only the source bits that 
increase control are processed, while redundant bits are thrown away. In 
this enterprise, devices as scientific theories and technologies are 
viewed as artifacts that help in this task, where the main goal is to 
increase the organism‘s control upon the environment. This conceptual 
framework suggests a replacement of old and anthropomorphic concepts 
as truth and reference by concepts such as lossy encoding, redundancy, 
noise, complexity, and control.  
3.5  Final Comments 
 
It‘s important to remember that the formal model offered here 
doesn‘t intend to be a feasible one as it stands.  A real model would 
include feedback, memory and much more complex distortion function.   
However, it doesn‘t limit the theoretical framework due to its generality.  
The main point of this discussion is to introduce a theoretical framework 
through which science and technology can be viewed in the context of 
control purposes – preservation of organism‘s life.  A very important 
conclusion is that the gap between the processed information and the 
environment is not bridged by any mythical notion such as ‗truth‘, or 
‗reference‘, but by successful interaction with environment.  In this 
dissertation, ontology is a question of degrees of freedom in successful 
action, while epistemology is a question of optimal coding schemes.    
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4 CHOOSING BITS: HOW CULTURE SHAPES OUR 
THOUGHT 
Nowadays, our discourse includes many things our eyes have 
not been wired to see. Almost everyone is comfortable speaking about 
electrons, magnetic fields, galaxies, or black holes, even if almost no 
one has ever seen such things. To top it all off, we also seem to learn, 
through our biological development, how to see the world differently. 
Thereby musicians are able to categorize music according to melody, 
harmony, and counterpoint; painters are able to distinguish colors, hues 
and forms; and scientists are very attentive to specific patterns in nature; 
and so on. Whether determined by Mother Nature (innate) or shaped by 
culture (learned), our brain seems to be both processing and discarding 
parts of environmental information.  The question is: How does the 
brain choose the relevant information that must be processed at any 
time?  
In this chapter, I will offer a model which explains how our 
brain tells the difference between relevant and redundant information. I 
will divide this choosing process into two stages; innate and learned 
perceptions. The innate perception processing stage is determined by 
genetic factors and has little, or no, plasticity. Genetic factors, on their 
own, seem to have been set by the evolutionary process.  On the other 
hand, the learned perception processing stage depends on multimodal 
processing interactions and is very plastic. In any specific situation, the 
brain generates a representation of one given modality of perception that 
is more informative about another modality.  In this sense, the 
information coming from a given sensory modality becomes a relevant 
variable determining the information compressed in another sensorial 
modality. The cultural factors will be interpreted as relevant variables 
that interact with each other in order to generate more informative 
representations.  
4.1  Sensory Processing Stages  
 
The process generating the perception we experience, if we 
accept that it is grounded on the neural system‘s dynamics, can be 
divided into at least two stages; the peripheral nervous system and the 
higher-order processing centers in the neocortex (KANDEL, et al. 
2000). The peripheral nervous system consists of two types of neurons; 
the sensory neurons, running from stimulus receptors that inform the 
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Central Nervous System, (CNS) of the stimuli; the motor neurons, 
called effectors, running from it to the muscles and glands, that take 
action. The higher-order processing centers in the neocortex are very 
complex neural structures responsible for the processing and integration 
of information sent by the peripheral nervous system – such as the 
visual area in the occipital lobe–and for elaboration and command of our 
motor plans. Very importantly, the preprocessed information that arrives 
at the higher-order centers is the only information to which our brain has 
access. In other words, the peripheral nervous system is our window to 
outside reality. What falls outside this window is simply not taken into 
consideration by the brain.      
4.1.1 The innate perception processing stage. 
 
The aforementioned window defines the spectrum of categories 
upon which our ―world‖ is constructed, it is the first processing stage of 
perception. However, different from real windows by which light is the 
same signal carrying information from outside to inside the house, our 
metaphorical window requires this information being translated from the 
outside language to the organism‘s inside language – e.g. the kind of 
signal whereby outside objects‘ information arrives at eye‘s retina 
(bundle of photons) is not the same as the one that goes from the retina 
to the brain‘s visual area (strings of action potential)
9
.  The translating 
task is accomplished by our sensory organs – eyes, ears, touch sensory 
receptors, taste buds, and olfactory receptors–which are stimulated by 
the external signals, thereby producing a string of internal signals. The 
structure exhibited by each string of internal signals defines the set of 
categories we are able to perceive, such as color, size, velocity, 
numerosity. The question is: How can we measure the quality of this 
translation?  
To answer that question, the metaphor of translation shall be 
replaced by the notion of compression of information. In this new 
framework the environmental information is symbolized by a variable   
and the signal emitted by a specific sensory organ by a variable  .  An 
encode function   merges sequences of source bits   into string of 
internal signals     I will refer to the translation hereafter as encoding. A 
convenient modeling is to define the encode function as a set of 
conditional distributions  ( | ) which relates each source bit to every 
                                                             
9
 Here seems to dwell grounds for the philosophical intuition that we don‘t have 
direct access to outside reality or reality as such. 
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string of internal signals according to some probability – the sensory 
organ is now an information channel.  Notice that the closer the 
distribution  ( | ) is to a determined distribution the more information 
is transmitted through the channel. In other words, if every source bit is 
one-to-one mapped to a different string of internal signals, then our 
spectrum of categories would be as informative as possible. On the other 
hand, as long as the number of source bits is mapped to one specific 
string of internal signals, the spectrum of category‘s quality decreases. 
This measure, which I will call the complexity of the encoding, can be 
grasped through the notion of conditional entropy  ( | ) which is zero 
for perfect representations and increases along with the decreasing of 
their quality – see 2.3.2.1.for a detailed explanation of these concepts. 
The question is: On what does the coding complexity depend in 
biological organisms? 
4.1.2 The cytoarchitecture and encoding’s complexity  
 
Each sensory organ is viewed as an encoding function which 
maps the outside information into strings of action potential relaying 
information to higher-order areas in the brain. The encoding function‘s 
complexity is revealed by the cytoarchitecture of the sensory cells. To 
exemplify the relation between complexity and cytoarchitecture let us 
look at how the eyes encode light information into strings of action 
potential.  
Figure 9 Layer of Photoreceptor Neurons 
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In all vertebrates‘ visual system, the light enters the lens and 
passes to the back of the eyes, where it traverses the retina, passing 
through layers of transparent cells to reach the rods and cones. The rods 
and cones are the light sensitive cells which, if sufficiently stimulated by 
light, produce an action potential stimulating the downward cells.  This 
action potential will go through a set of interneurons until they reach the 
ganglion cells whose axons will form the sensory pathway [Figure 9].  
All visual information processed by further brain stages is the 
information transmitted by the ganglion cells. Therefore, in order to 
estimate and compare the amount of visual information processed by the 
retina one has to inquire about the ganglion‘s response relative to a 
variety of stimuli.   
Different cytoarchitecture may cause different ganglion 
response relative to the same bundle of stimuli, so as different functions 
may give rise to different images. Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch, and 
Pitts (1959) found that the frog‘s ganglion seems to respond to just four 
categories of stimuli; boundaries, dark convex boundaries, moving or 
changing contrast events, and dimming events. The frog, however, has 
not shown any response to different stimuli if there is no change. For 
example, the frog doesn‘t snap at a flea if it is not moving; i.e., if a flea 
doesn‘t move, then it is identical to any other lifeless entity. Differently, 
Hubel and Wiesel (1962, 1965) found a much more abundant set of 
responses or categories in the cat‘s ganglion responses. The cat ganglion 
seems to react to characteristics such as hues, colors, and angles, 
resulting in a wider set of categories than that found in the frog‘s case. 
Similarly, a set of women seem to react to a more abundant light stimuli 
than a set of men, providing evidence that women see more colors on 
average than men (JAMESON, 2007). 
The difference in the categories or representations‘ complexity 
among the species is grounded in the cytoarchiteture of the sensory 
cells. To illustrate this point, let us look at two examples.  The first 
example is the neuron which signals temporal and movement pattern. In 
Figure 10, the neuron‘s dendrites receive an input from the 
photosensitive cells and generate an action potential only if the 
summation of all inputs A, B, C and D can pass the cell‘s threshold. The 
cell‘s threshold is the minimum potential difference between inside and 
outside cells such that once achieved it generates an electrical pulse that 
will actively propagate at full amplitude instead of fading passively. 
Notice that if the distances between the bottom input and the soma are 
gradually longer, so that the distance between D and the soma is longer 
than the distance between C and the soma and so on, then the inputs 
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emitted by the photosensitive cells will take gradually longer to arrive at 
soma. Assuming that the threshold can only be achieved by the 
summation of all input, the neuron will fire only if a spot of light 
impinging the input bottoms is moving from right to left, and the 
velocity of that motion falls within certain limits. 
Figure 10 - Temporal and Movement Detector Cell 
 
The second example concerns the case in which some animals 
are able to see a larger set of colors. This characteristic is called tetra 
chromatic color vision, and it happens when the organism‘s eyes have 
four retinal cone types plus the capacity to transmit four independent 
cone signals (two short, one medium, and one long-wavelength 
sensitive) (JAMESON, 2007). Some scientists conjecture that humans 
with four retinal photo pigment classes might experience a dimension of 
perceptual experience denied to trichromatic individuals (JORDAN & 
MOLLON, 1993); implying that cortically, humans might process four 
color channels, or otherwise learn how to use the additional information. 
4.1.3 The innate perception stage is mostly genetically determined. 
 
In all the above cases, the sensory cells are mapping outside 
information in strings of action potential – they are compressing the 
information. If every bit of information is one-to-one mapped into 
different strings of action potential, then the compression is called a 
lossless one; otherwise, it is called a lossy compression. How the 
information will be compressed in the peripheral processing stage is 
determined, if not absolutely, at least mostly, by genetic factors – room 
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here is left for epigenetic factors.  In the previous first example, the 
geometrical structure of the neuron signaling temporal and movement 
pattern was determined by genetic constraints. It has been shown that 
the cell differentiation process in the retina is controlled by multiple 
basic helix–loop–helix (bHLH) genes, which function as intrinsic 
regulators (HATAKEYAMA & RYOICHIRO KAGEYAMA, 2004; 
VETTER & BROWN, 2001; CEPKO, 1999). In the second example, 
the retinal expression of four distinct cone classes is determined by 
random X–inactivation during embryonic development, so that genes 
from both altered and normal pigment genes are alternatively expressed 
as photo pigments across the retina‘s cone cell mosaic (JAMESON, 
2007).  At this processing stage the individual has little or no chance to 
change it. The same applies to the other senses; i.e. eyes, ears, touch 
sensory receptors, taste buds, and olfactory receptors. The question is: 
Can the peripheral processing stage fully explain our cognitive 
experience? 
4.2  Learned Perception Processing Stage 
 
Is there any further processing stage beyond the genetically 
innate perceptual compression? It seems, intuitively, that there might be, 
since when viewing a particular scene it is possible to interpret it in 
many different ways.  I will interpret this fact as another compression 
stage at which a portion of the information transmitted by the sensory 
pathway is processed and yet another portion is discarded.
10
  In contrast 
to the innate processing stage, I will call this other compression stage, 
the learned processing stage since most of the categories defined at this 
stage seem to be learned through the organism‘s development
11
. The 
intention of my explanation is to both bring up perception‘s essential 
characteristics as well as provide a possibility for future research.  
The two main ideas structuring my explanation are bottleneck 
encoding and statistical dependence. The bottleneck encoding refers to 
lossy compression cases in which the relevant information is chosen by 
                                                             
10
 The idea that visual perception is compression, in some ways, is obvious 
simply by the scaling down of representation areas in the brain's visual system 
from the very large visual area V1 to the smaller V2 and still smaller V4 (RAO 
& BALLARD, 1999). 
 
11
 If there were further processing stages, then every glance would contain every 
bit of information transmitted by the sensory pathway and the notion of 
―perspective‖ would lack any sense. 
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taking in consideration a target variable, thus called a relevant variable. 
The sensory system is viewed as a set of channels processing 
information so that the information resulting from a specific sensory 
organ   (e.g. hearing or haptic) determines the relevant information 
encoded by another sensory organ   (e.g. vision); i.e. what one hears 
determines what one sees. However, it presupposes a statistical 
dependence between   and   that has to be learned in some way by the 
brain.  I will give a detailed empirical scenario, then will unfold the 
theoretical explanation.  
4.2.1 Empirical scenario 
 
The empirical scenario is characterized by three main ideas; the 
fragmented character of the perceptual visual onset, the preceding 
interaction routines, and the emergence of language. There seems to be a 
relation among these three ideas so that the interaction routines are a 
logical presupposition for the emergence of a unique intersubjective 
representation among the individuals of a same community, and the 
emergence of a unique intersubjective representation is a logical 
presupposition for the emergence of language.  
4.2.1.1 Fragmented character of the perceptual visual onset 
 
There is evidence supporting the interpretation that our 
perception is shaped by experience through the development of the 
organism. The internal representation generated at the onset of the 
ontogenetic process seems to be very fragmented – e.g. distinct objects 
may appear as one unique object and conversely. Within this evidence 
are the findings that infants can perceive a whole object as early as 2-
months of age only if the object undergoes motion (JOHNSON & 
ASLIN, 1995). However, the ability to perceive the object as a whole, 
without motion, does not develop until the age of 6.5 months, and the 
ability to discern the form of the objects‘ hidden area does not appear 
until 8 months (OSTROVSKY, 2010; CRATON, 1996).  
The fragmented character of perception not only features the 
perceptual onset of the newborn babe but it is also present in vision 
recovery cases. The same fragmented character is found in individuals 
who acquire sight late in life (VON SENDEN, 1932; GREGORY AND 
WALLACE, 1963; VALVO, 1971; FINE et al., 2003; OSTROBSKY, 
2010). Although these individuals show a situation pretty much like the 
newborn baby, they need longer to acquire the visual skills, possibly due 
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to decreases in plasticity (OSTROBSKY, 2010). This result 
corroborates the hypothesis of two levels of information processing, one 
determined mostly by genetic factors and the other determined mostly 
by environmental factors.   
4.2.1.2 Interaction routines and joint attentional episodes 
 
A fragmented representation of the environment is not useful 
because it conducts the organism to wrong action plans – i.e. taking a 
cup and a table as a unique object would conduct the agent to drop the 
cup on the floor in many cases. On the other hand, cooperation among 
the community‘s organisms requires a convergent representation in 
order to establish common action plans – how can we arrive at a 
consensus if we are unable to pay attention to the same environmental 
features? Psychologists seem to view joint attentional episodes as 
evidence for a convergent representation (TOMASELLO & FARRAR, 
1986; TOMASELLO, 1988; CARPENTER, et al., 1995; 
TOMASELLO, 2003). According to Tomasello, ―[j]oint attentional 
episodes [are] defined as relatively extended periods (at least 3 seconds) 
for which both parties are focused on the same object at the same time 
and the child acknowledges that jointness with, for example, a look to 
the mother‘s face‖ (TOMASELLO, 1988, p. 72; my emphasis).  
However, these episodes seem to be scaffolded by an even deeper stage 
in the organism development, namely, interaction routines. According 
to these authors, the first steps of communication are implemented by 
interaction routines in which the task structure of the routine and the 
maternal scaffolding play a central role (RATNER & BRUNER, 1978; 
NINIO & BRUNER, 1978; BRUNER, 1983; TOMASELLO, 1988; 
TOMASELLO, 2003). Then, it seems, that interaction routines are the 
path to a congruent representation, which has as a symptom, joint 
attention.  
4.2.1.3 Language emergence  
 
According to Tomasello, once joint attention focus has been 
achieved, around 6 months, the child begins to use actions – pointing 
and interactions with object – so as to direct the adult‘s attention. As we 
are going to see later, it means that they use proprioceptive information 
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to determine the relevant visual/hearing/haptic information
12
. In other 
words, once the subjective experiences of two or more different 
individuals become similarly structured the language acquisition process 
starts. The first referential expressions usage appears – holophrastic 
speech - around 12 months. These referential expressions function as 
proper names conducting the adult‘s attention to specific portions of the 
scene. Around 18 months, for the first time, children share the focus of 
attention on some object or activity and proceed to make a linguistic 
comment about that topic (holophrastic predication). Later on, language 
starts to acquire its grammatical structure. It‘s very important to note 
that as soon as language has been acquired, it ―[…] then becomes one of 
her [child] primary devices for establishing and maintaining joint 
attention with an adult […], making it a transitive process‖ 
(TOMASELLO, 1988, p. 1975). The term ‗transitive‘ here means that 
the role played by action in determining joint attention is now 
transferred to language.  
4.2.2 Theoretical framework 
 
The explanation of how each modality of perception is 
compressed will be best expressed by the Rate Distortion theory or, 
more precisely, by an extension of the Rate Distortion Theory, i.e., 
Information Bottleneck Method (TISHBY et al. 1999; SLONIM, 2002). 
As we will see, this theoretical framework will give us interesting 
conceptual insights about philosophical questions.  
Let   be a discrete random variable with a finite set of possible 
values,  , distributed according to  ( ).  Let   denote some other 
discrete random variable which is a compressed representation (or 
quantized codebook) of  . This representation is defined through a 
(possibly stochastic) function associating the values of these two 
variables. Formally, this mapping can be characterized by a conditional 
distribution  ( | ), inducing a soft partitioning of   values. 
Specifically, each value of   is associated with all the codebook 
elements (  values), with some normalized probability. As the 
                                                             
12
 To say that a convergent representation has emerged is synonymous with 
saying that the philosophical notion of object has emerged. From this point of 
view, the notion of object is always an abstraction. A difference in between a 
less – particular – and a more abstract – general – entity is the difference 
between a compression with less distortion – particular - and with more 
distortion – abstract – measure.   
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cardinality | | increases, a perfect representation of these random 
variables becomes more demanding. What determines the quality of this 
compressed representation?  
 It seems natural to determine the quality of the compressed 
representation by the quantity of information that   conveys about  .  In 
order to ensure the transmission of information occurs, sequences of 
different inputs from   have to produce disjoint sequences of outputs 
from   – i.e., if two different bits    e   , for    , result in the same 
output   , then no information is conveyed. The uncertainty 
characterizing the association between each input and each output is 
given by the conditional entropy  ( | ), which is  ( | )    when 
there is no uncertainty at all (when the system is determined) and is 
 ( | )   ( ) when there is only uncertainty and no information is 
conveyed. Using the Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) (COVER 
AND THOMAS, 2006), it is possible to see that for each typical n-
sequence of   symbols, there are    ( | ) possible   ―input‖ n-
sequences, all of them equally likely.  Again using AEP we see that the 
total number of typical   n-sequences is    ( ).  In order to ensure that 
no two   sequences will produce the same   sequences, the set of 
possible   sequences has to be divided into subsets of size    ( | ), 
where each subset corresponds to some different  -sequence. The total 
number of such disjoint subsets is upper bounded by   ( ( )  ( | ))  
   (   ). Therefore, we can send at most    (   ) distinguishable 
sequences of length n from   to  . The mutual information  (   ) 
emerges as the natural measure for the representation‘s quality.  Is it 
enough?  
 Very often one is looking for a more compact representation   
of the information source  . In the CNS case, for example, it is not 
interested all the time in the most detailed environmental representation, 
and there are a multitude of control tasks for the brain, so that it is 
always looking for the most parsimonious representation. Hence the 
objective becomes to minimize the amount of processed information – 
i.e., minimize the mutual information  (   ), which is written as 
 (   )  ∑ ∑  (   )    
 (  )
 ( ) ( )  
. However, if one writes the joint 
distribution  (   ) as  ( ) ( | ) and the probability  ( ) as 
∑  ( ) ( | ) , then the mutual information can be written as  (   )  
∑ ∑  ( ) ( | )    
 ( ) ( | )
 ( )∑  ( ) ( | ) 
  . With the mutual information 
written in terms of the source distribution  ( ) and the conditional 
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distribution  ( | ), it becomes clear that minimize  (   ) is the 
minimization problem over the entire set of all possible distributions 
 ( | ) – which is easy to prove to be a strictly non-increasing convex 
set (COVER AND THOMAS, 2006). Notice that the minimum that the 
distribution  ( | ) can assume is when, given a    in particular, all the 
n values of   are uniformly possible – i.e., when the two variables   and 
  are statistically independent and no information is conveyed. 
Therefore a restriction over this minimization problem is necessary, 
otherwise all information is lost.  
 The restriction in the minimization problem is the main point of 
the Rate Distortion Theory (RDT), because it is what will determine the 
source‘s relevant information.  In the Rate Distortion Theory‘s 
traditional approach, the restriction is given by the distortion measure 
(Definition 3.3), a function that measures the distance between the 
source variable   and the representation variable  . A distortion value   
is given by the expected value of the distortion function   
  (     ) over a sequence of n bits. The RDT gives us the Rate 
Distortion Function,  ( )      ( | ) ∑  ( ) ( | ) (  )  (  )  (   ), 
which is the infimum of rates   such that (   ) is in the rate distortion 
region of the source for a given distortion D. As already stated, the 
minimization is over all conditional distributions  ( | ) for which the 
joint distribution  (   )   ( ) ( | ) satisfies the expected distortion 
constraint. This problem can be solved by introducing a Lagrange 
multiplier,  , and then minimizing the functional   , ( | )-  
 (   )   ∑ ∑  ( ) ( | ) (   )   under the normalization 
constraints ∑  ( | )         . The drawback with this approach is 
that the distortion function‘s design is a completely arbitrary subject 
matter and very often it is virtually impossible to imagine what such 
function could be
13
.  
Another approach to set a restriction in the minimization 
problem is called Information Bottleneck Method (TISHBY et al., 
1999). In this approach, which can be viewed as an extension of the 
traditional approach (SLONIM, 2002), beyond the information source 
variable   and its compressed representation   , we must also consider 
another variable,  , the so-called relevant variable. In this case, instead 
of considering the source distribution  ( ) and an arbitrary distortion 
measure  (   ), we will consider just the joint distribution  (   ) 
                                                             
13
 The variational problem can be solved by using converging iterative Blahut-
Arimoto Algorithm (COVER AND THOMAS, 2006). 
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between the variable   and  , provided they are not statistically 
independent, and a Markovian property, characterizing the relation 
among the variables  ,  , and  . Thus, we will look for a compressed 
representation   of   that is more informative about   – i.e., we want to 
minimize  (   ) and maximize  (   ), so that  (   )   ̂, where  ̂ 
is a minimum of relevant information. The distortion upper bound 
constraint is now replaced by a lower bound constraint over the relevant 
information, given by  (   ).  
As in the traditional case, we are looking for the most 
compressed representation   of   – i.e. we want to minimize  (   )  
∑ ∑  ( ) ( | )    
 ( ) ( | )
 ( )∑  ( ) ( | ) 
  , where the free parameter 
corresponds to the stochastic mapping  ( | ). To correlate the 
representation‘s quality  (   ) with the relevant information  (   ) 
we use the Markovian property. As the representation   cannot convey 
more information to   than the source variable   and there is no new 
information in   about   given  , the three random variables form a 
Markov Chain in the following order      .  Therefore, we can 
use the Markovian property to compute the relevant information  (   ) 
in the following way:  
 
{
 
  ( )  ∑  (     )  ∑  ( ) ( | )
   
 ( | )  
 
 ( )
∑  (     )  
 
 ( ) 
∑  (   ) ( | )
 
 
Where  (   ) is assumed to be given and   ( )  ∑  (   ) .  Notice 
that by minimizing the representation‘s quality  (   ) we are 
automatically minimizing the relevant information  (   )  As in the 
traditional case, this variational problem is solved by using Lagrange 
Multipliers,  , ( | )-   (   )    (   )14. The Lagrange 
Multiplier   controls the performance of the distribution  ( | ) given a 
cardinal in | |. For    , every   values is assigned to just one   
value; and for    ,   becomes the most informative representation 
given a fixed number of representatives – if | |  | | and    , then 
  just copies   in every aspect.  In our case, as | | can be viewed as 
                                                             
14
 As in the rate distortion case, the variational problem here can be solved by 
using a converging iterative Information Bottleneck Algorithm (TISHBY et al. 
1999). 
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standing for the channel capacity, | |  | |, thus even though     , 
we still will have a lossy compression due to information processing 
limits.  However, what is more interesting about this formalism is that it 
gives us optimum representations even for finite values of   and 
| |  | |.  
4.2.3 “What one hears determines what one sees.” 
 
Our experience of the world is multimodal – e.g. objects have 
color, sound, texture, and so on – even though we have a different 
sensory channel for each sensory modality. The sensory stimuli feeding 
the different sensory organs don‘t seem to be statistically independent 
since the association of their contents results in successful interactions 
in most cases. If so, then the internal representation we experience can 
be understood as the compressed representation which maximizes the 
statistical dependence among the different concomitant sensory stimuli. 
For example, our visual experience is a compressed representation of the 
stimuli emitted by the visual sensory pathway which holds the most 
statistical dependence with another concomitant stimulus – such as the 
proprioceptive feedback coming from our present movements. In the 
theoretical model, the sensory stimuli are for the   variable, the internal 
representation is for the   variable, and the concomitant stimulus is for 
the   variable [Figure 11]. Evidently, the variables   and   can be for 
Figure 11 - The information X coming from the peripheral processing is compressed 
in a representation Y which maximizes the information about Z, another modal 
information. Y will serve as parameter for future action. 
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different sensory stimuli modalities – such as visual and hearing, hapic 
and visual, and so on. 
The aforementioned statistical dependence has to be learned, in 
most cases, that cars (visuospatial pattern) honk ―beep beep‖ or that the 
sound ―chair‖ occurs in situations where one is interacting with the 
visuospatial pattern, chair. As soon as those statistical dependencies start 
getting wired into the brain – based on Herb‘s principal
15
 – our internal 
representation starts to get unified. Based on a rough convergent 
representation, the learning process starts to bind multimodal features so 
that visuospatial patterns have taste, sounds precede events, form has 
texture, and so on. Language seems to be just one of those modal 
features – although one that we have more control over. Thereby the 
brain seems to grasp the recurrent event of a specific sound   given a 
representation  , which quickly becomes recorded as a memory  . If 
the recurrences are interpreted as a conditional distribution   ( | ), 
interesting conclusions seem to follow.   
To begin with, as the baby‘s world is pretty simple and 
recurrent, the conditional distribution tends to be almost determined – 
e.g. given the sound ―chair‖,  the baby‘s home chairs come to his/her 
mind. Determined conditional distributions can be interpreted as 
standing for proper names - i.e. the sound   brings to the baby‘s mind  
                                                             
15
 This learning process is pretty natural in the brain, provided that there is a 
neurological basis for that. Therefore, according to the Herb principal – neurons 
that fire together, wire together- frequent co-activation makes, gradually, more 
likely co-activation, again and again.  
Figure 12 - The distribution of probability p(m|s) depicts the semantic relation 
between the sound S and the semantic content M. 
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his/her home chair with probability approaching 1 and other 
chairs with probability approaching 0. As the learning processing goes 
on the  ‘s domain gets larger, the conditional distribution gets more 
scattered and the meaning gets more abstract – predication gets in. Once 
the recurrent event gets wired into the brain, the stimuli   becomes the 
relevant variable  . The occurrence of    gives a partition of the domain 
  according to the distribution  ( |  ).  Now instead of considering 
just the joint probability  (   ) we will consider the distribution  
 (   |  ). Different stimuli   will induce different partitions of the M‘s 
domain, resulting in different representations   of  . Therefore, what 
one hears determines what one sees [figure 12]. 
4.2.4 Does CNS have a model in the Information Bottleneck 
structure? 
 
Despite of the brain‘s great complexity there seems to be some 
touch points between the theoretical model and the real system. 
Different processing stages are preceded before we are able to hear, or 
to see, or to feel, and act in the outside world (KANDEL et al., 2000; 
PANDYA & SALTZER, 1982). After the phylogenetic level of 
information processing, the sensory information is processed in a series 
of relays along several parallel pathways from peripheral receptors. This 
information arrives at the first information processing station, the 
primary sensory cortex, where it is processed in a fragmented way – e.g. 
the color information is processed separately from the form information, 
and so on. After the primary sensory cortex the information is relayed to 
the second processing station, the unimodal association cortex, where 
the fragmented modal information is integrated in a unique code – i.e. in 
a unique pattern of neural activation. Every modal station – i.e. visual, 
auditory, and somatosensory unimodal association cortex – projects 
itself to the next processing station, the multimodal association cortex, 
which integrated information from different modalities.  
The sensory information is processed sequentially from the 
peripheral receptors through every processing station, and in parallel in 
the sense that every modality is processed at the same time converging 
to a multimodal representation. In fact, the multimodal association 
cortex has been seen as the neural substrate of consciences – patients 
with damage in the inferior parietal lobule cannot locate objects in their 
visual world or construct an internal representation of the world around 
them (amorpho-synthesis) (KANDEL et al., 2000). There are three main 
multimodal association cortex areas; posterior multimodal sensory 
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integration, limbic association area, and anterior multimodal motor 
integration. The posterior parietal station is responsible for the sensory 
integration, which has been the philosophers‘ obsession.  The limbic 
integration center is responsible for memory and emotional expression. 
The anterior multimodal motor integration station is responsible for 
converting all the information coming from these centers in motor plans 
– actually both centers project themselves to one another. In our model 
the posterior multimodal sensory integration station could be viewed as 
the representation   and a unimodal station as the variables  . The 
variable   in the model could be interpreted as any station coactivated 
with that specific unimodal station  .   
 The circular problem with this interpretation is that at the 
beginning of the ontogenetic development there must be a system in the 
CNS able to process modal information without any relevant variable – 
otherwise every compression would require a relevant variable   and so 
on.  Is there any kind of innate faculty in the brain?  
4.2.4.1 Mirror neuron system, action understanding, and autism. 
 
According to the empirical scenario above described, a convergent 
representation emerges from the routines of cooperation. According to 
our hypothesis, the brain encodes the information coming from one 
sense, maximizing the mutual information from another information 
source. The question is: What kind of information is available to the 
newborn infant which seems to be decisive in the compression of the 
perceptual information in the routines of cooperation scenes? A 
plausible explanation seems to be that the brain is taking proprioceptive 
information – routines of cooperation – as the information which is 
going to determine the relevant visual/hearing information to be 
compressed. In other words, the infant‘s brain seems to look for a visual 
– or hearing – compression which makes more sense to the adult‘s script 
of actions. If so, then action understanding must be an innate faculty and 
there should be severe impairments when this innate faculty is damaged. 
Is there anything such as an innate action understanding faculty? Is there 
any severe impairment related to the damage of this skill? Yes, there is! 
Mirror neurons have been identified as the action understanding system, 
and autism seems to be strictly related to damage in this system.     
Mirror neurons are a particular class of visuomotor neurons, 
originally discovered in area F5 of the monkey premotor cortex, that 
discharge both when the individual does a particular action and when 
he/she observes another individual (monkey or human) doing a similar 
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action (DI PELLEGRINO et al. 1992, GALLESE et al. 1996, 
RIZZOLATTI et al. 1996a; RIZZOLATTI & CRAIGHERO, 2004). 
Empirical evidence suggests that the mirror-neuron system is the basis 
for action understanding (BUCCINO et al., 2001; FADIGA et al., 1995; 
FLANAGAN and JOHANSSON, 2003; GALLESE et al., 2002; 
KEYSERS and PERRETT, 2004), imitative behavior (LACOBONI et 
al. 2001; LACOBONI et al. 1999; NISHITANI and HARI, 2000), face 
imitation (CARR et al. 2003; LESLIE et al. 2004), and joint attention 
(COLOMBI et al., 2009). The areas in which mirror-neurons are found 
– these areas comprise the opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus lobule 
(BA44) and its adjacent ventral area 6 (inferior frontal cortex, IFC), the 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL), and the superior temporal sulcus (STS) – 
show activation during mental representation of one owns action, and 
mental representation and observation of another person‘s action 
(BUCCINO et al. 2001; BUCCINO et al. 2004; DECETY and 
GREZES, 1999; DECETY et al. 1997; GRAFTON et al. 1996; 
GREZES et al. 2003; GREZES and DECETY, 2001; HARI et al., 1998; 
RIZZOLATTI et al., 1996). An important aspect to be noticed about the 
mirror-neuron system is that it is not sensory modality dependent; i.e., 
the mirror-neuron system is able to extract an action representation 
whether from visual or hearing information (KOHLER et al. 2002; 
RIZZOLATTI and FADIGa, 2005). Empirical evidence supports the 
thesis that the mirror-neuron system is an inborn faculty, because the 
skills that it seems to account for are present in neonates at only 36 
hours old (FIELD et al., 1985; FIELD et al., 1982; MELTZOFF & 
MOORE, 1977, 1983; HADJIKHANI, 2007).    
Autism is a disease which has been characterized as a mild to 
severe qualitative impairment in communicative abilities, reciprocal 
interactions, repetitive and stereotyped behavior, lack of attention to 
faces, and deficits in joined attention (OSTERLING & DAWNSON, 
1994; MUNDY et al., 1993; HADJIKHANI, 2007). Much evidence has 
linked mirror-neuron system (MNS) impairment with autism. Scientists 
have found in anatomical studies that adults with HFA (high-functioning 
autism) display significantly reduced cortical thickness in areas of the 
MNS. In addition, the degree of cortical thickness decrease was 
correlated with the severity of communicative and social symptoms of 
the subjects (HADJIKHANI  et al., 2006; HADJIKHANI, 2007). They 
also have found, in behavioral experiments using 
electroencephalographic studies that Asperger subjects, unlike normal 
controls, did not profit from mirror-image movement of others during an 
imitation task (AVIKAINEN et al., 2003; NISHITANI et al., 2004). By 
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using functional MRI studies, scientists have found that areas of the 
MNS were hypo-activated in the HFA compared to controls. They found 
hypo-activation in right motor somatosensory cortex corresponding to 
the face representation; and they also found an inverse correlation 
between the activation in the IFC and the severity of the social 
symptoms (HADJIKHANI  et al., 2004; HADJIKHANI  et al., 2006; 
HADJIKHANI  et al., 2007; DAPRETTO et al., 2006). Similar results 
have been found by using transcranial magnetic stimulation studies 
(THEORET et al., 2005), electroencephalographic studies (LAPAGE 
and THEORET, 2006; OBERMAN et al., 2005), and electromyographic 
studies (MCINTOSH et al., 2006).  
4.3  Heuristic and Philosophical Conclusions: The Role of Culture 
 
According to this interpretation, cultural factors are viewed as a 
concomitant stimulus which determines the relevant information in a 
given perceptual stimuli source.  The concomitant stimulus activates the 
memory content, according to a statistical correlation learned in 
experience, which interferes in the perceptual processing.   It explains 
why people with different backgrounds tend to have different 
perspectives of the world – they have learned different statistical 
correlations. Based on this theoretical model, important results follow as 
its consequence.  
4.3.1   Cultural factors form a continuous spectrum. 
 
According to the theoretical model, the quality of the internal 
representation depends on the degree of dependence between the 
concomitant stimulus and the sensory stimuli. This degree of 
dependence is quantitatively grasped through the formal notion of 
mutual information  (   ). If so, notice the following facts: the  (   ) 
is always upper bounded by the original information,  (   ) – i.e. the 
statistical dependence between the internal representation and the 
concomitant stimulus cannot be greater than that one held by the sensory 
stimulus and the concomitant stimulus. Additionally,  (   ) is clearly 
upper bounded by the source information,  (   )   ( ) (COVER & 
THOMAS, 2006) – i.e. a representation   of a variable   cannot be 
more informative about   than the one    variable. Therefore, we must 
also consider the normalized relevance compression plane, where the 
vertical axis is determined by 
 (   )
 (   )
 while the horizontal axis 
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corresponds to 
 (   )
 (   )
 [Graphic 2]. The normalized relevance-
compression function is, thus, always bounded between one and zero, 
hence different joint distributions  (   ) can be characterized and 
compared by their corresponding curves in these normalized plane. 
Notice that as the set of all possible joint distributions  (   ) is also a 
non-increasing continuous convex set, the distance between less 
informative stimuli from more informative ones is continuous. 
Therefore, the putative different among religion, pseudo-science, and 
science is just contextual. All these sets of stimuli are informative in 
some extent, thereby, conducting to some internal representation; 
however, some of them are more informational than others.  Graphic 1 
demonstrates how different relevant variables give rise to different 
information-compression curves.  
Graphic 2 – The different curves display different information processing 
performances relative to different relevant variables. 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
4.3.2 Theories, interpretation, and mathematics. 
 
The mutual information  (   ) can also be written  (   )  
 ( )   ( | ), which means the difference between the entropy of   
and the conditional entropy of    given  . The entropy  ( ) is for the 
quantity of information transmitted by the perceptual source  , and the 
conditional entropy  ( | ) is the uncertainty about occurrence of the 
perceptual stimulus    given the concomitant stimulus   has happened. 
The conditional entropy  ( | )  ∑  ( )   ∑  ( | )     ( | )    
depends on the conditional distribution  ( | ), so that the more 
scattered the distribution is over the  ‘s domain given    , the greater 
uncertainty. For determined distributions there is not uncertainty at all. 
Notice that the degree of scatteredness of the conditional distribution 
 ( | ) can be interpreted as the stimulus‘ ambiguity. For example, how 
many things will come to mind when the word ―thing‖ is spoken? The 
conditional distribution for the occurrence of the stimulus ―thing‖ is 
very scattered. On the other hand, how many things will come to mind 
when the word ―snake‖ is spoken? According to this interpretation, 
stimuli that are amenable to varied interpretations are less informative, 
whereas stimuli that constrain our interpretative freedom are more 
informative. And that is why mathematics is the most suitable metaphor 
in most cases, because its concepts are often strictly well-defined, it 
constrains our interpretative freedom. This interpretation gives another 
perspective on the logical Popperian conclusion that ―[a] theory which 
adds to all information which it asserts, can also negate this information,  
giving us no information at all‖ (POPPER, 1962, p. 319) – in our 
interpretation it means that   is statistically independent of  .  
4.3.3 Metaphysical implications.  
 
We have seen that different variables   will induce different 
representations   of  . However, what does it mean to say that a 
variable    is different from another variable, to say,   ? All that counts 
here is the complexity involved in the relation between the variable   
and   which is expressed by the mutual information  (   ). It means 
that if two concomitant stimuli    and    hold the same joint 
distribution  (   ), then they will give rise to the same representation   
of  . In summary, if two conceptual schemes present the same 
complexity, they are equivalent. In other words, if different scientific 
theories result in the same experimental plans, then they are equivalent. 
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The only relevant aspect of a source of stimuli is its statistical 
dependence with the occurrence of other stimuli. Equivalent theories 
induce the same representations, and better theories produce more 
informative representations.    
4.4  Final Considerations 
 
The theoretical model offered here introduces a new line of 
thought rather than an experimental model, as it stands. The brain‘s 
information processing involves more stages (more variables) even in its 
most general description. However, I believe that it doesn‘t make the 
model inappropriate since the general principal seems to be the same – 
i.e. to extract information from a variable while saving information from 
another one. It also should be noted that the motivating insight here – 
that some sort of information interacts with the perceptual information – 
is not a new one, and that psychologists already have noted this aspect 
of our cognition (BARSALOU, 1999; BERGEN, LINDSAY, 
MATLOCK, & NARAYANAN, 2007; ESTES, VERGES, & 
BARSALOU, 2008; GALLESE & LAKOFF, 2005; GLENBERG & 
KASCHAK, 2002; MATLOCK, RAMSCAR, & BORODITSKY, 2005; 
METEYARD, BAHRAMI, & VIGLIOCCO, 2007; RICHARDSON, 
SPIVEY, BARSALOU, & MCRAE, 2003; SPIVEY & GENG, 2001; 
STANFIELD & ZWAAN, 2001; ZWAAN, MADDEN, YAXLEY, & 
AVEYARD, 2004; ZWAAN, STANFIELD, & YAXLEY, 2002), even 
though the interaction mechanisms between abstract metaphors and 
perception still remain a moot question  (DILS & BORODITSKY, 
2010; RICHARDSON et al., 2003; BERGEN et al., 2007; 
BORODITSKY, 2000). Whether this theoretical model will provide a 
basis for experimentation is a future problem. Nonetheless, it seems a 
worthy enterprise, considering its possible conceptual gains. 
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5 THE SYMBOLISM AS A CHEAP CHANNEL CODE: THE 
SYMBOLIC LANGUAGE’S ROLE IN COGNITION 
In general, there seem to be different ways in which human beings 
cognitively handle sources of information. Tasks, such as number 
guessing, velocity, weight, and extension estimation, can be 
accomplished through different cognitive strategies – e.g. by counting, 
or comparing objects‘ characteristics, and so on. In most cases, these 
different ways imply different performances and costs to the subject. In 
this chapter, we offer an interpretation of these ―different ways‖ in terms 
of different channel codes through which the environmental information 
is processed by the Central Nervous System (CNS). By considering the 
channel code‘s cost and performance, we will distinguish among three 
categories of codes; prompt processing, working memory, and symbolic 
coding scheme. The code metaphor affords alluring explanations to 
important questions, such as: Why do we have the internal 
representation that we have – in terms of colors, extension, and texture? 
Why are simple theories considered better than complex ones? Why do 
different representations of a given system, even if conflicting, result in 
the same action plans (experiments)? In most cases, examples will be 
given through the number guessing experiments, though the general 
principles seem to be applicable to cognitive tasks broadly. 
5.1  Theoretical Framework 
 
The information processing carried out by the Central Nervous 
System (CNS) is interpreted as the communication system whose 
performance is measured in terms of control. Therefore, environmental 
information is processed by the sensorial organs resulting in action plans 
whose objectives are to keep the organism alive. Whenever an accident 
occurs I will assume some bit of information had been wrongly decoded 
– the average over the suffered accidents gives the degree of control – or 
the lack of control. According to this interpretation, an information 
processing system is specified by six entities, grouped into three pairs: 
The source ( ( )  ), consisting of a probability distribution  ( ) and a 
distortion function  ; the channel ( ( | )  ), consisting of a 
conditional probability distribution  ( | ) and a cost function  ; and 
the code (   ), consisting of the encoder   and the decoder   functions 
[Figure 13]. For the purpose of this paper, we are concerned with 
discrete and finite alphabets.  
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Figure 13 Information system  
Definition 5.1 (Source) A discrete-time memoryless source ( ( )  ) is 
specified by a probability distribution  ( ) on an alphabet   and a set 
of Hamming-like distortion functions. Let’s take the power set  ( ), so 
that  ( )  {  ̿     ̿     ̿ | |}. Now let us define a set of Hamming-
like distortion functions    *  (   ̂)     (   ̂)     | |(   ̂)+ so 
that 
  (   ̂)  {
        ̂       ̿        ̂       ̿
        ̂       ̿
     
is called the Accident Distortion Measure, which results in a probability 
of error, since    (   ̂ )       (   ̂). This implicitly specifies an 
alphabet  ̂ in which the source is reconstructed. As the alphabets are 
discrete, we call this, a discrete memoryless source, and the probability 
distribution becomes a probability mass function (pmf ).  
Definition 5.2 (Learning Function) To choose among the  | | 
distortion functions   (   ̂), a set of sequences   
  *          +  
   is generated according to the distribution of probability  ( ), the so-
called typical set of  . Then we define an index function   so that 
    
                                                                                                      
 is called Learning Function. The learning process is a question of 
finding out the Learning Function  . The sequences in   
  can be 
interpreted as the typical situations occurring in our world. 
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Definition 5.3 (Channel) A discrete-time memoryless channel 
( ( | )  ) is specified by a conditional probability distribution  ( | ), 
defined on two discrete alphabets   and   and a nonnegative function  
                                                                                                   1.3. 
called the channel input cost function. When the alphabets are discrete, 
we call this a discrete memoryless channel. 
Definition 5.4 (Source-Channel Code) A source-channel code of rate 
R (   ) is specified by an encoding function 
      ,                                                                                             1.4.    
yielding code words   ( )   ( )     (   ), the set of code words is 
called the codebook or coding scheme. 
And a decoding function 
      ̂,                                                                                             1.5. 
such that k/n = R, where m is for m uses of channel and k is for number 
of bits per source symbol. 
For a fixed source ( ( )  ), a fixed channel ( ( | )  ) and a fixed 
code (   ), we can then easily determine the average incurred 
distortion,  
      ( 
   ̂ ),                                                                                1.6. 
and the average required cost, 
    (  )                                                                                        1.7. 
The information source   is merged in a codebook (     ) 
through the encode function   and transmitted through the channel 
 ( | ) at a cost  . The channel output is decoded through the function 
  resulting in source estimation (or representation)  ̂, resulting in a 
distortion  . The maximum quantity of information transmitted through 
the channel, given the cost constraint  , is defined in terms of Mutual 
Information as following: 
Definition 5.5 (Capacity-Cost Function) The capacity-cost function of 
the channel ( ( | )  ) is defined as 
 ( )      ( )   ( )   (   )                                                          1.8. 
The cost measure limits the quantity of information that the channel can 
transmit reliably. According to the Source-Channel Separation Theorem, 
if  ( )   ( ), then there exist a source-channel code so that the 
probability of error goes asymptotically to zero. Otherwise, if   ( )  
 ( ), then the probability of error is bounded above zero – which means 
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that the     (COVER & THOMAS, 2006). In other words, if the 
source entropy is greater than the channel-cost capacity, then no 
compression can be carried out lossless. The function which gives the 
compression rate, for fixed distortion value  , is the Rate-distortion 
function. 
Definition 5.6 (Rate-Distortion Function) The rate-distortion function 
of the source ( ( )  ) is defined as 
 ( )      ( ̂| )    (   ̂)    ( | ̂)                                                     1.9.         
On the other hand, the function which gives the distortion value, for a 
fixed rate  , is the Distortion-rate function.                                                
Definition 5.7 (Distortion-Rate Function) The distortion-rate function 
of the source ( ( )  ) is defined as 
 ( )      ( ̂| )  (   ̂)     (   ̂)                                                   1.10.  
We are most interested in the distortion-rate function, where the 
parameter    ( ); i.e. given the channel-cost capacity, we are 
interested in codes which can reduce the distortion value   as close as 
possible to its limit. The main objective of this chapter is to compare 
different coding schemes and their respective distortion values    in 
order to measure their efficiencies.  
5.2  Prompt Processing Scheme: Subitizing 
 
Prompt information processing is represented by the following setup: 
An information source   emits a sequence              , of   bits of 
information, which is compressed through a encoding function   onto a 
channel input sequence              of   bits of information, for 
    and    . The  -bits sequence is the perceptual information 
consisting of size, color, texture, length, numerousness, and so on, and 
the  -bits channel input sequence consists of our internal representations 
about the outside world. The clause that     means exactly that the 
coding function is lossy compressing the environmental information into 
the internal representation. The  -bits channel input sequence is 
processed through the channel  ( | ) generating an output sequence 
            , which is the semantic meaning invoked by the internal 
representation. The output sequence generated by the channel is 
decoded through decoding function   in a motor plan  ̂     ̂     ̂ , 
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for     [Figure 1]. The pair (   )  is precisely our ordinary 
representations which ground our intuitive notion of reality. The channel 
has a cost limit   so that sequences              have their length 
constrained – supposing that we‘re just interested in cases of reliable 
transmission.   
 In order to measure the average of error of the code 
(   )   some psychological experimentation is needed. Some cognitive 
experiments assume the following general format: A perceptual sample 
is showed for a short period of time – often less than one second – and 
then it‘s asked for the subject to give the suitable motor answer for it – 
which is either voicing something or pushing a lever or executing more 
elaborate action plans. An example is the guessing experiments in which 
a given setup is quickly shown – e.g. a set of objects – and the 
individual has to guess the exact characteristics of the setup. Typically, 
the experiments‘ results present inconsiderable error average relative to 
sparse sources of stimuli – whether numerosity, extension, or velocity. 
But, as the source information rate is increased above a given quantity, 
the average of error starts to increase almost-linearly along with the 
source information rate. Sometimes this average of error is also 
expressed in terms of the Weber‘s Fraction, which is a constant 
describing of the slop of variance‘s growth recta related to the 
increasing of the quantity of information (KRUEGER, 1989)
16
 – as the 
variance increases the error average does as well. The Weber‘s Fraction, 
for numerical processing is around 12% (TRICK, & PYLYSHYN, 
1994), for size-constancy processing it is around 4% (MCKEE & 
SMALLMAN, 1998), and for the object‘s speed and trajectory 
processing it is between 5%-10% (MCKEE & WATAMANIUK, 1994; 
MCKEE & SMALLMAN, 1998; HARRIS & DEAN, 2003). Still other 
perception‘s modalities, such as color hues (BARLOW, 1956, 1977; 
LILLYWHITE, 1981; BIALEK, 1990; BANKS et al. 1987), show the 
same trade-off between the source information rate and error average.  
The trade-off between the source information rate and the 
average of error can be appreciated in the number processing case. In 
the number guessing experiment, a setup containing a given number of 
entities is shown for a short period of time – often less than one second 
– and the subject has to guess the setup‘s numerosity.  The subject‘s test 
performance gives rise to two numerical processing phenomena; subitize 
                                                             
16
 The guessing performance‘s uncertainty can be conceptualized through 
different notions; for example, either in terms of variance, or entropy, or simply 
as a conditional distribution.  
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and estimation. In the former condition, one is able to subtly recognize 
the set‘s numerosity up to around 3 or 4 elements while, in the latter 
condition, only an estimation is possible  KAUFMAN et al. 1949; 
TRICK, & PYLYSHYN,1994; DEHAENE, 1997). As the term 
―subitizing‖ suggests, it occurs when the individual subtly recognizes 
the set‘s numerosity as rapid as 40-100ms/item, effortless, and very 
accurate – practically error-free. On the other hand, for setup‘s 
numerosity greater than 4 only estimations with some degree of 
uncertainty are possible, which means that the average of error is 
bounded above zero.   
Kaufman et al. (1949) represented the subjects‘ number guessing 
performance through the trade-off between uncertainty and the source 
information rate [Graphic 3]. The certainty axis is divided in 6 degrees, 
where 5 means complete certainty and 0 means complete uncertainty. 
Notice, that at 4 or 5 objects, there is almost complete certainty while it 
brusquely decreases after 6 objects. Graphic 3 shows clearly the almost 
linearly increasing of the average of error, after a given value, along 
with the source information rate increasing. Therefore, if few objects 
compose the setup, the visual representation achieves the right 
magnitude with high certainty; i.e.     . Otherwise, for large setup‘s 
numerosity, the average of error is bounded above zero,     . In 
summary, the code  (   )  compresses the  -bits perceptual sequence 
in an  -bits channel input sequence, which consists of our internal 
representations about the outside world. As the channel-cost capacity 
limits the number of bits reliably transmitted, the perceptual sequence‘s 
bits are lossy compressed in the channel input code words. The 
compression carried out by the code  (   )  is a kind of all-purpose 
one, for even in the situations in which only numerosity is interesting, 
color information, for example, cannot be stripped out from the 
representations. For this reason, the perceptual sequence‘s bits interact 
with each other so that a setup with exceeding color information disrupts 
the number processing, for example (KAUFMAN et al. 1949; 
ALVAREZ & CAVANAGH, 2004). The uninteresting information is 
called redundancy and the prompt processing scheme doesn‘t seem to be 
a good code to handle specific situations. But why has nature endowed 
us with such a code? The reason seems to be that the (   )  code is a 
good code, on average, over many different situations. When the 
average distortion   is calculated for whole set   of Hamming-like 
distortion functions   (   ̂), the expected value  ( )  
 
 | |
∑   
 | |
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results in a tolerable value – i.e. it keeps the organism alive in most 
cases.  
Graphic 3 - Certainty Versus Numerousness 
5.3  Working Memory Scheme: Biological Recoding 
 
The main idea of the previous discussion was that the prompt coding 
scheme is a good one when handling a variety of situations, but it is not 
an optimal code when handling specific tasks – i.e. it is a good source-
channel code averaging over all Hamming-like distortion measures 
  (   ̂), but it is a bad one for a subset of them. For specific situations, 
where just some specific bits are relevant, a different coding function 
would be better.  
This time I will examine how the working memory‘s role in 
cognitive tasks fits into our previous theoretical model. The working 
memory is basically a memory system needed for executing complex 
motor tasks when the essential cues are not present in the environment 
at the time of the response (KANDEL et al., 2000). The system, in 
different ways, seems to help the performance of cognitive tasks. I will 
interpret the working memory as an encoder which employs different 
codes (   )  according to different distortion measures   (   ̂).  
The term ‗working memory‘ refers to a brain system that 
provides temporary storage and manipulation of the information 
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necessary for such complex cognitive tasks as language compression, 
learning, problem solving, and action planning (REPOVS & 
BADDELEY, 2006). The working memory has two broad functional 
characteristics; maintenance and manipulation of information. 
According to the multicomponent model (BADDELEY, 2010, 2012), 
the information maintenance is putatively carried out by three distinct 
systems; the phonological loop, the visuospatial sketchpad, and the 
episodic buffer. The first two are modal subsystems, respectively, for 
auditory and visual information, while the last is a multimodal 
integration subsystem. Still each maintenance system has two functional 
distinctions; the passive storage and active rehearsal of information. The 
passive storage retains the information temporarily and it is subject to 
loss by decay or interference over time. The active rehearsal of 
information tries to simulate the retained information so as to keep it in 
mind – e.g. rehearsal would correspond to the common strategy of sub 
vocally repeating the sequence of digits to oneself. The other broad 
functional characteristic, manipulation of information, corresponds to 
the central executive, which is responsible for recoding the information 
in a new format – such as when one sub vocally repeats some sequence 
of digits according to a specific format. Neurological evidence suggests 
that the anterior regions of the cortex – such as inferior frontal cortex 
(BA 44; Broca‘s area) and premotor cortex (BA 6) – are responsible for 
rehearsal and manipulation, while posterior regions of the cortex are 
responsible for storage – such as inferior and superior parietal cortex 
(BA7/40) and right inferior parietal cortex (BA 40) (PAULESU et al., 
1993; AWH et al., 1996; SMITH et al., 1997; HENSON, 2001).  
 Even if the temporary storage and manipulation roles can help 
in cognitive tasks separately, we will focus on the cases in which they 
seem to work together in order to recode the perceptual information 
(KANDEL et al., 2000; BADDELEY, 2010, 2012). The preprocessed 
information is retained in one of the storage systems and then it is 
recoded by the manipulation system. For example, for the case in which 
one is interested in the setup‘s numerosity, the subject can recode the 
setup‘s numerosity in terms of ―chunks‖ so as to surmount the prompt 
processing limit (COWAN, 2001, 2006; FEIGENSON & HALBERDA, 
2004; LUCK & VOGEL, 1997; IRWIN, 1992; 1996; MILLER, 1956).  
Therefore, if the processing of numerousness was limited to around 3 or 
4 objects (subitizing), then by using working memory one is able to 
increase this number to around 7, with very low average of error 
[Graphic 4] – without counting! The encoder‘s role is viewed as an 
endeavor to deploy different source-channel codes (   )  in order to 
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reduce distortion value    according to every specific   – remember that 
the index   is given by typical sequence (situation) occurring. The new 
mental representation (channel input) generated by the working memory 
is very poor concerning color, size or texture information, but it is much 
more informative about numerical information – it is a better code for 
handling redundancy.  
If it is plausible to interpret the working memory as an encoder, 
then the information kept in it should be of a preprocessed kind. 
Neuropsychological evidence offers support for the independence 
between the working memory‘s information and the semantic content 
currently retrieved through it. Among this evidence is the fact that 
similarities in semantic content currently retrieved through a set of 
stimuli are irrelevant for the acuity with which these stimuli are kept in 
working memory.  For example, if one were given a list of words, such 
as ―map‖ ―tap‖ ―lap‖ ―flat‖ and so on, it would be difficult to remember 
all those words because the stimuli displays similar pattern.  On the 
other hand, if one were given a list of words, such as ―house‖ ―home‖ 
―abode‖ ―apartment‖ someone would not have as much of a problem 
remembering even if the semantic content is about the same. This is 
because working memory functions at a preprocessed level not taking 
into consideration the semantic content. (COLLE & WELSH, 1976; 
SALAMÉ & BADDELEY, 1982). Still, the concurrent modal 
information tends to disrupt different modal information kept in working 
memory. There is a reduction in recalling lists of visually presented 
items brought about by the presence of irrelevant spoken material. The 
spoken material‘s semantic content is completely irrelevant, with 
unfamiliar languages or noisy sounds being just as disruptive as 
meaningful words in one‘s own language. These results are interpreted 
under the assumption that disruptive spoken material gains obligatory 
access to working memory (COLLE, 1980; SALAMÉ & BADDALEY, 
1982).  
 Even if the working memory allows the brain to surmount its 
limits of prompt processing, it doesn‘t get far enough. This system 
appears to be strikingly limited in capacity, and can only store a small 
amount of information for short periods of time – it‘s around three items 
for not more than three seconds--in the number processing case 
(COWAN, 2001, 2006; LUCK & VOGEL, 1997; IRWIN, 1992; 1996; 
MILLER, 1956). On the other hand, working memory‘s representation 
is still structured with the same prompt processing code‘s properties – 
i.e. even if it privileges some kind of information, say numerosity, it 
cannot preclude the other kind of information, such as colors, forms, and 
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so on. For example, if a dense colorful setup is presented, it causes the 
numerical capacity of visuospatial sketchpad, which is generally 
estimated to be about 4 items, to decrease (COWAN, 2001; MILLER, 
1956). These results generalize the working memory‘s limits for the 
setup‘s complexity, rather than for just the number of objects 
(ALVAREZ & CAVANAGH, 2004).  
Graphic 4 - Certainty Versus Numerousness by Using Working Memory 
 
5.4 The Cultural Strategy: the Employment of Symbols 
 
The working memory, as previously mentioned, is an encoding 
system which stores information and recodes it. The problem with this 
system is that it is severely limited in storage capacity. Additionally, the 
working memory code is too costly for optimally handling large 
amounts of information; its overload causes severe disruption to many 
cognitive tasks. A new and less costly format is the channel code 
(   )  17, which represents symbolic language as another coding 
scheme. The symbolic language coding scheme has at least two 
advantages in comparison with the internal representation schemes. 
First, it is a cheaper and more efficient channel code than the internal 
representation schemes and, second, it liberates the working memory to 
                                                             
17
 A similar interpretation, in terms of two mental calculation systems, has been 
offered by Dehaene (1991). 
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help in learning, problem solving, and planning tasks. By using a more 
efficient code, much more information can be reliably transmitted, 
which ends up improving drastically the system‘s control upon the 
environment.  
 
1.1. Efficiency and cost 
 
The three-object prompt processing limit can be interpreted as 
the channel-cost capacity. An efficient channel code should achieve the 
smaller error rate by compressing the source information in code words 
that don‘t exceed the complexity expressed by that setup. To compare 
two codes‘ efficiency one should pay attention to its average of error on 
the cognitive tasks. By comparing the internal representation codes‘ 
performance with the symbolic performance in numerical tasks, one can 
see the huge difference in efficiency [Graphic 5].  
 
Graphic 5 – Certainty Versus Numerousness by Using Symbolic Language 
 
The graphic is, to some extent, speculative because 
mathematical skills based on symbolic language mastery vary according 
to cultural factors such as training, educational system efficiency, and so 
on. At least two groups of evidence support the interpretation of the 
symbolic language as a channel coding scheme; (i) the symbolic 
language deficit increases the error rate in retrieving the right numerical 
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magnitude; and (ii) the symbolic systems‘ evolution proceeds seems to 
be constrained by brain processing cost-capacity.   
(i) The symbolic language deficit increases the error rate in 
retrieving the right numerical magnitude. There is a correlation between 
the bloom of the mathematical skills and mathematical language 
competence. The burst of conceptual and interactive mathematical skills 
with which to handle quantities beyond the subitizing‘s and working 
memory‘s numerical capacity is concomitant with the numerical 
language acquisition. The ability to count and handle larger 
numerosities rises in children around  
 
 
 years old just when numerical 
linguistic devices start being mastered (GALLISTEL & GELMAN, 
1992; WYNN, 1990). On the other hand, evidence from Amazonian 
Indigene groups have supported the thesis that language is a condition of 
possibility for exact representation of numerosities beyond subitizing 
quantities. The group‘s individuals, whose language misses linguistic 
devices for quantities larger than 3-or-4 objects, have shown only an 
ability to estimate over larger quantities (PICA et al., 2004; MCCRINK, 
et al., 2012). Neuropsychologists have found that disorders in number 
representation frequently are accompanied by disorders in language. 
Patients with brain damage in areas typically associated with language 
faculties have shown a severe impairment with exact numerical 
processing of larger quantities. These same patients, however, still keep 
their capacity to exactly represent quantities up to three objects and to 
estimate over larger quantities (SPELKE, & TSIVKIN, 2001; 
DEHAENE & COHEN, 1991; MCCLOSKEY, 1992; WARRINGTON, 
1982).  
(ii) The symbolic systems’ evolution proceeds seem to be 
constrained by brain processing cost-capacity. As human interaction 
routines require the processing of larger quantities, it increases the 
demand for channel code bits. Different numerical notional systems 
have different costs, which eventually obligate us to change from one 
numerical notational system to another according to the increase of the 
demand. The complexity expressed by the around-three-objects 
representation can be interpreted as standing for the channel-cost 
capacity limit, which doesn‘t mean that this limit is the around-three-
objects numerosity, as it contains figurative information as well.  
Probably, the first numerical notational system used consisted 
of bundles of sticks paired one-to-one with the setup‘s objects [Figure 
14]. It was the least efficient numerical notation, because its only 
advantage was that of keeping the informational content out of the ever 
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changing environment, which saves short or long-term memory demand. 
However, as the number of sticks increases along with the set of objects‘ 
numerosity the bundle-of-sticks coding scheme meets the same 
subitizing‘s and working memory‘s limits. Therefore, the bundle-of-
sticks numerical system is a costly channel code to process quantities 
larger than fifteen or twenty objects. Looking at the code‘s redundancy 
is another way to assess the code‘s efficiency. Notice that every stick 
can be permutated without changing the code‘s information, which 
means that the code uses much more bits than necessary to encode a 
given amount of information.  
Figure 14 - Bunch-of-Sticks Number System 
 
 The second, the naming-summation numerical system is a 
channel code category under which, for example, are the Egyptian and 
Roman number systems, characterized by the employment of naming 
quantities and summation strategies. The notational marks are for 
numerical magnitudes and their repetition means their summation 
(VÁZQUEZ, 2001; HOLENDER & PEEREMAN, 1987).  The marks 
retrieve numerical facts stored in long-term memory whose meaning is 
provided by inborn numerical skills or constructed by combining them 
(SIEGLER & SHRAGER, 1984; WYNN, 1995; SPELKE, & TSIVKIN, 
2001).  For example, the Egyptian inscription of the number 543 is 
HHHHHTTTTUUU, where the symbols H, T, and U denote the powers 
100, 10, and 1, respectively. Through the use of the naming-summation 
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numerical system the numerical information can be compressed in 
shorter code words than those provided by the bundle-of-sticks system 
(which is coextensive with the subitizing‘s and working memory‘s 
limits) – the Roman numerical system, which uses subtraction notations 
as well, produces even shorter compressions. However, as the 
permutation test indicates, the representation provided by the naming-
summation numerical systems still contains too much redundancy; e.g. 
the code words HHHHHTTTTUUU and HHUHUHTTUHTT express 
the same numerical quantity. Even though the naming-summation 
numerical system permits us to process exact quantities in the hundred‘s 
magnitude, it becomes too costly to process numerosities around the 
thousand‘s magnitude, meeting the subitizing‘s and working memory‘s 
limits. 
 The third example is the multiplicative numerical system - e.g. 
Chinese number system (VÁZQUEZ, 2001; HOLENDER & 
PEEREMAN, 1987). The multiplicative numerical system is also based 
on underlying additive and naming principles, but a supplementary 
multiplicative principle allows for suppression of the cumbersome 
repetitions of the symbols belonging to the same rank.  Different 
symbols for each unity (          ) are introduced. The Chinese 543 
is therefore written in the form,         . Although the multiplicative 
system uses five different symbols instead of three needed in 
hieroglyphic Egyptian, it makes it possible to compress the numerical 
information in shorter code words. However, as some permutation is 
still permitted –          means the same as          – the 
representation provided by this category of notation contains 
redundancy.     
 The last numerical system is the positional numerical system – 
the Arabic Number System (VÁZQUEZ, 2001; HOLENDER & 
PEEREMAN, 1987). This system was developed some time in the first 
half of the sixth century A.D. in India, from whence it spread more or 
less rapidly to the whole world through the Arabic people. The system 
uses only 10 symbols, the same former system‘s operations, and the 
rank of the units abstractly symbolized by the position occupied by these 
units in the code word. The Arabic numerical system encodes quantities 
in the usual way, as we know it,  and produces very short compressions 
of huge quantities – e.g.     , which is approximately the number of 
atoms in the entire observable universe. It also provides us with 
powerful algorithms by which different quantities and relations are 
compressed in shorter code words – equations. These algorithms can be 
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viewed as a whole class of encoding functions producing the shortest 
code words possible. As easily noticed, permutation among the symbols 
are not permitted without changing the encoded information. 
 Although the above discussion has been restricted to the 
processing of quantities, the same interpretation can be applied to 
different dimensions of perceptual information processing. Therefore 
different areas of applied mathematics are connected with different 
cognitive processing limits; e.g. geometry and size-constancy 
processing, differential calculus and object‘s speed and trajectory 
processing, and so on. The interpretation also seems to give an 
explanation to the intuition ―simple theories are the best theories‖ 
(POPPER, 1992; VAN FRASSEN, 1980), for the simple theories‘ costs 
are smaller, which decreases the probability of error. It‘s by no mere 
chance that much of the mathematician‘s work consists of, by exploring 
the isomorphism among different structures, finding simpler ways in 
which to solve a problem. However, it doesn‘t always mean that 
complex theories can be compacted into simple (low cost) 
representation. In fact, according to the source coding theorem, the 
lower bound compression is the  ( ), which is  ( )   ( ). 
Therefore, as long as one looks for less lossy representations, the code 
words‘ cost inevitably is to increase. 
5.5  Representations Stand for What? 
 
The representational interpretation of the internal experience 
and the symbolic language‘s role has dominated the occidental thought 
at least since Plato. The general idea of this line of thought seems to be 
grasped through the Varela et al. words: 
 ―[…] that the world is pre-given, that its features can be 
specified prior to any cognitive activity. Then to explain the 
relation between this cognitive activity and a pre-given world, 
we hypothesize the existence of mental representations inside the 
cognitive system (whether these be images, symbols, or sub-
symbolic patterns of activity distributed across a network does 
not matter for the moment).‖ (1993)(Italics mine).       
In the representational interpretation, the particularities of a given 
representation – such as colors, extension, or commutativity – stand for 
real properties from the outside world and it is the relation of 
correspondence or adequacy, with its reference to the outside world that 
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makes one representation better than another
18
. On the other hand, in the 
channel code interpretation of the representation‘s role, a code‘s 
intrinsic characteristics, for example, encoding light as colors or as wave 
lengths, has nothing to do with source information, all that matters is the 
source‘s and code‘s complexity. As we have seen, these particular 
coding aspects have rather a lot to do with channel and its cost, and not 
with the source itself. Speculatively, if the brain-cost capacity were 
greater (or infinity) than that suggested by cognitive experiments, the 
employment of symbolic language would be unnecessary.    
What does it mean to say source and code complexity? The 
intuitive way to understand this complexity is in terms of the degrees of 
freedom of the system‘s behavior or the degrees of freedom through 
which a system can affect another one. Mathematically, any system can 
be conceptualized as a set of variables and its degrees of freedom as a 
distribution of probability (ASHBY, 1957). If so, the Shannon Entropy, 
which is a function of the distribution of probability, emerges as a 
suitable measure of complexity in terms of the minimum bits necessary 
to describe unequivocally the system behavior
19
 (SHANNON, 1948; 
COVER & THOMAS, 2006). More importantly, the main purpose of a 
code is to convey the source‘s complexity as reliably as possible. 
However, very different codes can display the same complexity and 
their intrinsic characteristics will depend exclusively on the channel‘s 
nature. But how can we evaluate the code‘s performance? This is a very 
important question.  
To evaluate the code‘s performance, one has to measure the 
distance between the source information and the processing information, 
which is properly the source representation  ́. This distance is measured 
according to a distortion measure whose definition depends on the 
system‘s purpose. As we have said before, as the CNS is understood as a 
control system, the distortion measure has to be one that grasps this 
controlling dimension. In our model, the distortion measure is a 
Hamming-like distortion that we call Accident Function,   (   ̂)  
{
        ̂       ̿        ̂       ̿
        ̂       ̿
. The accident function interprets, 
                                                             
18
 It is worth noting that in the representational interpretation, the belief that 
simple theories are better has, in principal, no clear explanation. 
19
 Shannon Entropy is not the only measure of complexity. The Kolmogorov-
Chaitin complexity is also a measure of complexity and both measures are 
mathematically related (KOLMOGOROV, 1963; CHAITIN, 1969; 
GALATOLO et al., 2010).  
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as an error, the decoding which results in accident. Therefore, the 
symbol ― ‖ does not represent ―equals‖ or ―equivalent‖ but represents 
successful action – the symbol ― ‖  is for unsuccessful action. 
Therefore, if two coding schemes result in the same source 
representation (action plans), they will be equivalent for communication 
purposes. The perspective seems to be in agreement with one of the 
older philosophical insights; that we cannot compare the reality with 
subjective or symbolic representation. However, all the time, we 
compare and test the motor plans and empirical experiments resulting 
from these coding schemes. When a given code directs us to a 
successful motor plan, we say that ―it represents the reality‖. Putting 
these two ideas together we get to the following statement: Our 
epistemology (coding schemes) can be diverse, but our ontology 
(successful interaction) is unique.  
5.6   Conclusion 
 
I have been discussing, broadly, different paths taken by an 
organism to better perform cognitive tasks. In this interpretation, these 
―paths‖ are understood as different coding schemes through which 
information is processed by the Central Nervous System. Two main 
aspects concerning the coding schemes‘ performance were pointed out.  
These are the coding scheme‘s cost and its ability to handle with 
redundancy. We distinguished among three coding schemes to which 
the organism resorts: the prompt processing, working memory, and the 
symbolic coding scheme. The prompt processing scheme seems to be 
the better code on average; however, a bad one for specific tasks. The 
working memory coding scheme seems to be better than the former one, 
but still too costly to perform specific tasks optimally. The symbolic 
scheme seems to be the cheapest and the more dynamic one for handling 
redundant information. The coding scheme metaphor serves to explain 
the old philosophical insight that simple theories are better theories and 
to mark a division between the epistemological domains as diverse 
versus the ontological domain as unique.  
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6 AN INTERACTIONIST ONTOLOGY 
 In this chapter I will present my ontological thesis which is 
called, Interactionist Ontology. The interactionist approach is a realist 
ontology which establishes that what we are able to directly or indirectly 
interact with are the only things there are. The central tenet in this 
enterprise is grounded on the concept of action which is understood as 
our ultimate connection with the external world. Different from the 
common philosophical setup, the interactionist perspective doesn‘t 
assume a segregate picture in which there is a clear distinction between 
the knowing subject and the reality; rather it is built on a continuous 
picture in which the external world is a continuation  of us and 
conversely. As I will defend, the Interactionist Ontology accounts for an 
independent and unique world with which we interact. The contours of 
this world – or ‗the description‘ to use the wrong word – are given by 
the sequences of successful actions – i.e. the plans that keep the 
biological organism alive. Reality consists of those constraints which 
limit the range of all possible actions to those that are successful actions. 
As a conclusion, reality has, properly, no representation, but only 
restrictions of interaction.  
6.1 What is Ontology? 
 
Ontology may be described as consisting of a simple question: 
What is there, what exists? However, very often this question format is 
not considered very elucidatory; as Quine has pointed out, it promptly 
suggests the simple answer ―everything‖ (QUINE, 1980). In order to 
give a more comprehensive question format, some cherished conceptual 
framework, some epistemology is required, in which the question will 
be reformulated. For example, Quine translates the traditional question 
format in terms of the first-order logic existential statement ‗There is 
something which is such and such,‖ (QUINE, idem) in order to avoid 
reference to undesired entities. The epistemological choice is very 
important since it doesn‘t only define the ontological question‘s new 
format, but also constrains the range of possible answers. Thus, as a first 
philosophical step, one must be concerned with the choice of the right 
epistemology – i.e. one that will conduct the philosopher to satisfactory 
conclusions.  
Depending on what kind of ontology one is interested in 
defending, the previous question needs the additional clause 
―irrespective of whether or not we know it.‖ The clause corresponds to 
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one of our basics intuitions about the world: Independence. 
Independence tells us that whatever the reality is it is independent of us. 
Theoretically, it means the task of detaching the ontological domain 
from the epistemological domain. The problem of eschewing an 
epistemological infection of the ontological domain is called, 
epistemological predicament (BERGMANN, 1960). The failure in 
detaching these two domains is called, Idealism. What it says is, 
roughly, that knowing‘s are the only things there are (DICKER, 2011). 
Most philosophers try to keep the outside world‘s flame alive by 
offering some argument which, supposedly, saves independence – such 
as temporal endurance (STRAWSON, 1979) or data independence 
(BERGMANN, 1964). An ontology which saves, or intends to save, the 
reality‘s independence is called, Realism. As we will see, Interactionist 
Ontology is a Realistic Ontology. 
Another important intuition is: Unity. Unity tells us that 
whatever the reality is, it is not multiple, but unique. In some sense, 
unity seems to be narrowly linked to the notion of independence. Its 
connection is anchored on the intuition that the same object can be 
described through diverse ‗perspectives‘ and still be the same object. 
The contingent aspect of the description is commonly interpreted as 
inherent to epistemology, whereas the sense of sameness is interpreted 
as inherent to ontology. This opposition between 
contingency/perspective versus necessity/unity seems to presuppose 
independence since the detachment is required – even though the 
opposite is not true.     
The way the epistemological choice permits one to articulate 
the concepts of independence and unity gives rise to distinct ontological 
positions. As previously pointed out, if one simply gives up 
independence, then he commonly ends up an idealist. If someone is 
willing to hold up the two-domain distinction, then one is talking about 
some form of realism. And realism, by itself, splits in different forms. 
For example, when some degree of correspondence between both 
domains is assumed, there comes semantic realism and its variants – 
constructive empiricism assumes just a partial correspondence (VAN 
FRAASSEN, 1980) while stronger forms of realism may assume total 
correspondence. If, on the other hand, correspondence in its strongest 
sense is denied, then a pragmatic relation is assumed; therefore 
ontological pluralism (CARNAP, 1950) and instrumentalism (SUPPES, 
1967) are representatives. The biggest problem with semantic realism is 
that as soon as any attempt to describe the ontological domain is made, 
the philosopher steps back on the epistemological ground – very often 
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he/she rejects the semantic position‘s defense and just assumes an 
ontological realism while remaining silent about it. A clear elucidation 
of the notion of instrument is still necessary (SUPPES, 1967). 
This brief description of ontological enterprise sets the agenda 
for presenting the Interactionist Ontology. First introduced is the 
epistemological framework whereby I will reformulate the ontological 
question.  Next, I will show how these conceptual tools permit me to 
articulate the concepts of independence and unity, and connect them to 
central ontological requirements. Even though the Interactionist 
Ontology is a realist one, I would like to say, in advance, that it is 
neither of a semantic kind nor of an instrumentalist kind.  In fact, I will 
make severe criticisms of the semantic position while trying to explain 
its basic intuitions. And because the Interactionist position saves some 
basic intuitions from the semantic position, it cannot be considered as an 
instrumentalist one as well.  
6.2 Interactionist Epistemology  
 
As a methodological gambit, Interactionism is a naturalist 
position through which science and philosophy form a continuous rather 
than segregate spectrum – in the Quinean sense (QUINE, 1981). 
Therefore, the interactionist epistemology is free to use any scientific 
fact as long as it is helpful. The three basic facts grounding the 
interactionist epistemology are; that a biological organism is merged in 
a world; that it is in constant exchange of matter and energy with this 
world; that the only way the biological organism can interact with this 
world is by means of action (motor twitches). The first two facts come 
from thermodynamics of open systems, while the third one comes from 
the neuroscience. In this view, the organism is merged in the world 
continually exchanging matter and energy with the surrounding. 
However, not every quantity of matter and energy are desirable, since 
some quantities may cause the organism to die. Therefore, the organism 
needs a mechanism by which to choose the desirable quantities from the 
undesirable ones. This mechanism is the Central Nervous System (CNS) 
and it is called a control system. To accomplish its regulatory task, the 
control system has to know the quantities affecting the organism and to 
emit a response in order to keep it alive.  
The notions of ‗organism‘, ‗surrounding‘, ‗matter and energy‘, 
and ‗response‘ can be made precise by the cybernetic concepts of 
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‗system‘, ‗environment‘, ‗input‘, and ‗output‘, respectively
20
. The 
notions of ‗system‘ and ‗environment‘ are interesting because they 
disclose the fact that the relation between organism and surrounding is 
continuous rather than discrete. When modeling a system, these two 
notions are always arbitrarily set – body can be environment to the CNS, 
surrounding can be environment to the body, and so on – in the sense 
that there is no definitive point at which these notions are fixed 
ultimately. The notions of ‗input‘ and ‗output‘ are very important 
because by understanding their relation one is able to represent the 
system‘s dynamics and estimate its degree of control (as a function of 
the quantity of matter and energy). The input-output relation is 
established between sensorial stimuli and motor action, which shifts our 
attention from the internal representations to the optimality of our 
motor reactions – even though all of these events may occur in the 
middle steps.      
To better understand the relation between ‗quantity of matter 
and energy‘, ‗internal representations‘, and ‗degree of control‘, the 
previous framework is merged in information theory. The 
system/environment scheme is now understood in terms of a 
communication system in which the environment is viewed as an 
information source and the biological system as a communication 
channel [Figure 15]. In this scheme the quantity of matter and energy  
 
Figure 15 - Central Nervous System as a communication system 
 
 
                                                             
20
 Cf. chapter one for a detailed discussion of these concepts. 
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flowing through the biological system is viewed as the source 
complexity (the entropy), our internal representations are viewed as a 
channel code, and the degree of control as the system processing 
performance
21
. As we don‘t have complete control over the 
environment, it means that we‘re not processing the whole of 
environmental information – we don‘t ―see‖ everything from the outside 
world.  
 As shown in the Figure 15, the internal representations are 
viewed as sequences of code words which, transmitted through the 
channel, are decoded as sequences of actions. This interpretation reveals 
the contingent character which is, in fact, inherent to the way we 
represent the surrounding – genetic factors may produce very different 
internal representations
22
, mathematically different scientific theories 
can produce the same experimental results. Infinite coding schemes can 
be used to convey a given source complexity, varying in costs, 
complexity, and time processing. As long as the coding schemes result 
in the same action plans, they should be chosen according to the 
previous criteria
23
, which vary with each specific channel. In summary, 
there is no privileged view of a specific scene, although the sequence of 
actions has to be the same in order for the organism to stay alive.         
 Now consider someone‘s life as a stochastic process resulting 
from the transmission process, as there will always be some accident 
(distortion) in the course of life – whether grasping a class, or driving a 
car, or sending a spacecraft into space – a quantity of source information 
is being lost
24
. Distortion is a symptom of two situations: Either the 
channel code is not optimal or the channel-cost capacity is smaller than 
the quantity of source information. Both situations are not exclusive and 
the CNS probability exemplifies both of them
25
. There are two defies in 
order to surmount these drawbacks: construct channel codes that, for a 
fixed cost  , achieve smaller distortion  26 or find a criterion by which 
to choose those bits that decrease the distortion value from those that 
increase it
27
. This is the context in which science‘s role should be 
interpreted. As soon as better representations are devised – better 
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 Cf. chapter two for a detailed discussion about this point. 
22
 Cf. chapter one for a detailed discussion about this point. 
23
 Cf. chapter four for a detailed discussion about this point 
24
 Cf. chapter one for a detailed discussion about this point. 
25
 Cf. chapter one for a detailed discussion about this point. 
26
 Cf. chapter four for a detailed discussion about this point. 
27
 Cf. chapter three for a detailed discussion about this point. 
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scientific theories – more information is reliably transmitted – so the 
more control over the environment we have. We used to pay attention to 
more abstract aspects of scientific theory, but I‘m pretty sure that if I 
were a long-life extraterrestrial studying the human development, 
science‘s evolution would be nothing more than the increase of control 
over the environment.      
5.3 Interactionist Ontology 
6.3.1 What is there (exists)?  
 
Let me begin with the ontological question, ‗What exists?‖ 
According to the Interactionist Epistemology, the question, ―what 
exists?‖ can be translated as ―what can be, in principal, directly or 
indirectly, the environment for our own system?‖ As so many clauses – 
‗in principal‘, ‗directly or indirectly‘ – qualify this statement, let me 
unfold this formula. Imagine that we have two systems  and   , so that 
  *          + and   *          + are the variables defining 
each system, respectively – for simplicity, both systems are assumed to 
be discrete. A subset   *      
       + of ‘s variables are the 
variables in   whose change modifies the  ‘ variable values to some 
extent. Thereby, the subset   is, by definition 2.3, the environment of 
 28. Eventually, the system   is bigger than that defined as 
environment – i.e.     – so that the system contains hidden 
variables
29
 – typically prediction failure is interpreted as the existence of 
hidden variables, but not necessarily. To unveil the   s hidden 
variables, a system   is coupled between   and   so that, now, 
     – i.e. the hidden variables in  now modify the  ‘s variables 
through  . In fact, we will have a new system       . If    , 
then I will say that   is directly an environment for us. If      so 
that another system   is necessary in order to turn  into a complete an 
environment for us, then I will say that   is indirectly an environment 
for us. The term ‗in principal‘ allows for the possibility of the existence 
of a system   whose coupling ends up unveiling  . If there is no such 
system  , then one should assume that | |  |  |. In the above 
                                                             
28
 Cf. chapter one for a detailed discussion about this point. 
29
 Complex non-linear systems are not easily predictable, even though this fact 
is independent of hidden variables‘ existence (MAINZER, 2007).  
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scenario,   explains part of what we call technology30. This relation 
between system and environment gives sense to my use of the term 
‗interaction‘: two or more systems interact with each other if one of 
them can be environment to the other one.  
6.3.2 The skepticism about the external reality  
 
The skepticism about the external reality is broadly understood 
as the failure to ultimately justify the connection between our beliefs 
and their references. Its relevance to ontology is due to the fact that once 
the connection is in doubt, the notion of external reality is in doubt as 
well (NAGEL, 1987; STROUD, 2000). But let me break down this 
position in its details. According to this view, there is the subject who is 
responsible for the act of thinking, the content of thought, and the 
independent reality which serves as basis for thought content. The 
relation between these notions can be thought of in terms of two gaps; 
the gap between thought and its content, which is represented by the act 
of believing in something, and the gap between content of thought and 
independent reality, which is represented by the concept of truth. The 
two gaps are logically independent so that to believe in something 
doesn‘t imply that it is true and conversely. The first gap is bridged by 
the certainty of one‘s own intuition of believing in something. The 
second gap is the reason for endless philosophical quarrel. One may 
plausibly say that according to this view, the history of humanity is the 
history of trying to bridge the second gap – which one calls the 
achievement of knowledge. When one denies that this gap can be 
ultimately
31
 bridged, he is called a skeptic.  
The epistemological setup just described distances the knowing 
subject from the reality, thereby creating a gap which feeds the skeptical 
doubt. Because this gap is famous from Descartes‘ philosophy, I will 
call it, ‗Cartesian Cut‘. In this segregated view, the closest the knowing 
subject can get to the reality is through the concept of ‗content of 
                                                             
30
 Undoubtedly, part of what we call technology is a channel that we use to have 
access to portions of reality that we don‘t have in natural conditions. The 
thermometer is a typical case of   system through which the complexity 
contained in given noisily processed bandwidth of the spectrum of light 
(temperature) is converted in another bandwidth which works as a more 
efficient code (colors, geometrical forms).   
 
31
 The meaning of ‗ultimately‘ here can vary. It may mean, for example, to 
bridge the gap in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. 
120 
 
thought‘, which has been understood as ‗representation‘, or 
‗proposition‘, or ‗description‘, or ‗theory‘. Because ‗representation‘ is a 
very comprehensive term in this context, I will call this view, 
Representationalist. The problem is that as soon as one tries to apply the 
Representationalist View to the present scientific scene – for example, 
to biology – one is quickly lead to the conclusion that our 
representations are the main channel of communication with 
environment – which is pretty false. Representations can be gorgeous; 
however, if they don‘t end up in successful actions, they are useless. 
Therefore, there is something missing in the Representationalist View.    
It is in pretty contrast with the Representationalist View that I 
put the notions of system and environment to work. I said above that 
these notions disclose the fact that the relation between organism and 
surrounding is continuous rather than discrete. It means that what one 
considers a system and environment depends on their research interests, 
since there is no definitive point at which to make the cut – a 
conventional scale considers molecules, membranes, synapses, neurons, 
nuclei, circuits, networks, layers, maps, systems, the entire nervous 
system, the interplay among different organism‘s systems, the entire 
organism, a community, and the whole ecosystem. Every set of 
variables whose change shows some dependence can be considered a 
system.  Because all these scale levels are arbitrarily set, the relation 
between system and environment is a continuous spectrum. But what is 
the relevance of this fact to ontology? What one has to perceive is that 
the Representationalist View only makes sense in a segregated scene – 
one in which system and environment are not arbitrarily set. But it just 
doesn‘t find place in the world as we know it – there seems to be no 
adiabatic system in this world. On the system/environment metaphor‘s 
ground the question cannot be raised without logically violating the 
epistemological presupposition. In summary, the gap created by the 
Cartesian Cut is only a conceptual one; rather the ―external reality‖ is an 
extension of us. If this digression is correct, the skeptic‘s doubt is 
outflanked.  
One possible objection here is the following: ―In the same way 
one can fix the notions of input and output so that the input are sensory 
stimuli and the output are motor twitches, one can reinterpret it so that 
now our representations are the output. Therefore, we return to the 
Representational View once again – which saves the cherished reflexive 
method.‖ Whereas the argument‘s premise is true, the conclusion 
doesn‘t follow. The reason is that considering the organism as a 
complex system, if one sets our subjective representations as the system 
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output, then the environment will turn out to be not the usual 
surrounding, but the coordination of action in the frontal motor cortex
32
. 
And it brings up two important points. First that the interpretation of the 
notions of system and environment as biological organism and 
surrounding saves our mundane conception of ―external world‖ and, 
second, that action was the missing piece in the Representationalist 
View. In the end, the Representationalist philosopher may still opt for 
the Cartesian Cut, since, from the reflexive method, the thought attitude 
of believe in something is the only thing one cannot mistake. However, 
the Cartesian Cut doesn‘t offer a complete scene; it is not in agreement 
with our actual knowledge about the structure of biological system. 
Therefore, there seems to be a choice to be made; either we reject 
science and embrace the Cartesian intuition, or we reject the Cartesian 
intuition and embrace science. I embrace science.  
6.3.3 Ontology requires independence and unity   
 
Where is the ontological piece in the previous epistemological 
scene? I‘ve said before that the correct epistemological scene 
characterizing the human experience is one in which the path between 
what we usually call knowing subject and external world is continuous 
rather than discrete. For this reason, I‘ve chosen the notions of system 
and environment, since they present this required dynamic feature. 
However, one should admit that there is no necessary element in 
choosing system theory instead of any other metaphor. This is what I 
mean by contingent, or plural, feature inherent to epistemology – 
epistemology goes well as long as it explains well. But according to our 
most intimate intuition, ontology requires unity, or necessity. Still 
another important aspect is about independence. Even if the 
epistemological path is continuous in some sense, the region that I 
intuitively consider as external world cannot be contained in the region 
that I consider as my own experience. The region I consider as my own 
experience is characterized by the fact that I consider it as my 
experience – the things to which I pay attention depend on me. If I die, 
then there is no more experience. On the other hand, the region that I 
consider as external world is characterized by the fact that it doesn‘t 
depend on me. Whatever it is, it is by itself. The ontological domain is 
independent. 
                                                             
32
 Cf. chapter three for a detailed discussion about the brain regions responsible 
for sensorial representation and motor output. 
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Let me begin with Ontological Independence. In speaking about 
biological chordate organisms, it‘s very reasonable to interpret the CNS 
as a control system controlling the organism‘s life and the environment 
as current surrounding. The control system must choose, based on the 
environmental information, the right output in order to keep the 
organism alive – otherwise it dies. But now, by merging this control 
system picture in information theory, we are able to evaluate the control 
system‘s performance; if there are hidden variables, eventually the 
organism will incur in accident – otherwise not
33
. The environment   
becomes the source information  , the control system   becomes a 
channel  ( | ) – where the channel input   is environment    – , and 
the organism‘s performance becomes a error measure. In this scene 
hidden variables become lost information, and eventually ends up 
incurring in accident (error). When information is lost, decisions cannot 
be perfect. But now notice that the accident (error) is an authentic 
ontological criterion because it means that reality is claiming its own 
right of being. Whenever information is lost, the occurrence of accident 
doesn‘t depend on us anymore, but it depends on the reality in itself. 
What depends on me is epistemological, what doesn‘t is ontological
34
. 
This, therefore, defines the conceptual distinction between both 
domains. 
Now, what about the ontological unity (or necessity)? In the 
communication system the information has to be encoded in a channel 
code in order to be transmitted through it. Likewise, the surrounding 
information is also encoded in a brain code in order to be processed, 
resulting in an action plan. How many different codes can convey the 
same complexity through a given channel? In fact, infinite codes can 
accomplish this task varying in costs and complexity. But now if we 
interpret our different conceptual schemes, through which we handle our 
environment as a given channel code, we have a good characterization 
of the plural, or contingent, aspect of the epistemology. This 
contingency is only restricted by physical constraints, like cost and time 
delay
35
. The same cannot be said about the source representation. 
Different source representations entail different distortion values and, 
for a discrete source, such that just one representation decreases the 
                                                             
33
 Cf. chapter two for a detailed discussion about this point. 
34
 That is why I said that the Quinean criterion is not properly ontological. In his 
notion, ‗To be is to be the value of a variable,‘ there is no principal of 
independence.  
35
 Cf. chapter four for a detailed discussion about this point. 
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distortion value to zero
36
. It is in this precise sense that action 
represents, in a special sense, the ontological domain: Only one action 
plan can reduce the death risks to zero for a given perceptual sequence. 
As infinite channel code sequences can have the same complexity, every 
action plan sequence contains a different complexity – it is a different 
source representation.    
6.3.4 Epistemological predicament: stepping outside the 
epistemological domain 
 
I have said above that one of the main ontologist‘s task is to 
provide a detachment of the ontological domain from the 
epistemological domain. And I have said that, when the organism is 
handling with environment, the accident is the reality‘s reclamation of 
its own being. However, I think that a latent criticism to my position 
would go like this: ―You have said that independence is characterized by 
accident, but you‘ve defined ‗accident‘ in terms of a distortion function 
– which is in fact a probability of error. After all, I would say that 
you‘ve never left the epistemological ground and that, in fact, it would 
be a more comfortable position for you to assume an information 
metaphysics than to get stuck believing you are at somewhere else 
when, in fact, you‘re not.‖ This criticism represents the gist of the 
epistemological predicament. When someone rejects the possibility of 
the outflanked, usually one just assumes dogmatically the independence 
of reality and remains exclusively on epistemological matters. My 
gambit to outflank the epistemological predicament consists in 
highlighting that the measure of error depends on the action, which is 
not a theoretical entity. Action is a part of us already in the world. As 
accident is something that concerns action and not a theoretical entity, 
we are already on ontological ground. Whether one doesn‘t like of the 
analysis in terms of distortion measure and information, in fact, doesn‘t 
matter, because all that matters is the way someone chooses to interact. 
In others words, one‘s own epistemology is just one among a plurality 
of possible ones, whereas the ultimate criterion is how they will improve 
our interactions with surrounding. 
  
                                                             
36
 Actually it is true just for a hamming distortion function as defined in chapter 
two. 
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6.4 What is really out there? 
 
I have given a new format to the ontological question in terms 
of interaction and I also put action at the center of the scene.  I have 
argued that action seems to fill the gap between knowing subject and 
reality by attending to the requirements of independence and unity. But, 
of course, there is much more than just action outside – in fact ‗action‘ 
is still a vague concept. Therefore, there is still a ―face‖ missing of the 
Interactionist Ontology. Let us begin elucidating the notion of action 
which is part of our ‗self‘ that is already outside. The more abstract 
notion of action is given through the byproduct of the restriction of 
degrees of freedom. When walking through the house, my action plan is 
nothing but what results from the restriction imposed by the house‘s 
setting in order to arrive someplace in the house.  The trajectory of 
lifting my arm in order to grasp a class is what results from the 
restriction imposed by the surrounding‘s setting in order to grasp the 
glass. It is in this sense that an action plan, understood as sequence of 
muscle twitches, is a decoding from the environmental setting.   
But what is the portion of reality interacting with my action 
plans? Reality is exactly the restrictions over the degrees of freedom of 
successful actions plans. When acting successfully one is, to say, giving 
the contours of the world. Notice that it is a negative ―description‖ of 
reality, since it tells us what is out there by telling us where there is no 
restriction. Therefore, there always remains the question about the 
possibility of a more strict description – i.e. a more complex plan. In 
trying to give a stricter contour of the real, accident will tell us the limit. 
If the reality is discrete, then this complexity has a limit, otherwise, 
there will always be a more complex plan to be executed. The 
connection between science and ontology is made by means of the 
notions of code and processed information. More efficient coding 
schemes result in more processed information, which means more 
complex action plans. As soon as our information processing becomes 
more efficient, it must reflect in our actions‘ complexity, which is the 
second part of what we call technology. Technology in this new sense is 
the improvement of the output complexity. To be more illustrative, our 
body anatomy has the complexity propositional to our natural 
representation – in terms of colors, forms, and so on. As soon as this 
representation is replaced by a more efficient one – such as 
mathematical representation – our anatomy has to be enhanced with 
prostheses which increases the output complexity. These more complex 
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action plans give a more refined contour of reality – they get us closest 
to the real.   
6.5 Final considerations 
 
 The Interactionist Ontology dispenses any attempt to describe 
the real. In fact, it is on the epistemological ground and one will never 
get outside this way. The present ontology establishes, as a criterion for 
a good representation, the successfulness of the resulting actions plans 
(experimentation). As a conclusion it relaxes all the logical rigidity 
imposed by the traditional approaches to the philosophy of science, by 
focusing on how a given representation can guide us in interaction. 
Interactionism sets epistemology as an empirical science, where the 
central tenet is just how it improves action plans. I have treated 
epistemology as coding theory and I think it is a good metaphor for it. 
Even though, as any metaphor is a representation under which lies an 
ontology, one cannot intend any metaphor as the real metaphor – reality 
has no face; it is just the way our organism processes the information. In 
this scene, rationality is understood in terms of capacity of information 
processing, which results in degrees of rationality. These degrees of 
rationality form a continuous spectrum among the species ranking them 
according to the degree of control. Many points here mentioned deserve 
a stricter treatment, which is task for future work.   
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